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AIMING FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: HOW 
CITY LAWSUITS CAN HELP REFORM AN 
IRRESPONSIBLE GUN INDUSTRY 
Rachana Bhowmik* 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine an industry that manufactures products responsible 
for the death and injury of thousands of Americans. These 
products are distributed through a system in which no party—
neither the dealer, the distributor nor the manufacturer—takes 
responsibility or is held liable for the negligent sale of the 
product. The same distribution system guarantees that the product 
flows through the market to individuals that society has deemed 
unfit to possess and use such products. Despite the high number 
of deaths and injuries caused by the product, the manufacturers 
do not utilize reasonably available safety devices that would 
prevent accidental deaths and injuries, because there is no federal 
agency with authority to mandate such safety devices. Moreover, 
the manufacturers assume they will not be held liable under 
common law tort principles, so they continue to conduct business 
while innocent Americans continue to die from the foreseeable 
negligent use of the product. 
                                                          
 *Rachana Bhowmik, J.D. University of Virginia School of Law; B.A. 
Yale College. The author was an attorney with the Legal Action Project of the 
Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, co-counsel to many cities that have 
filed suit against the gun industry. The views expressed in this article are 
solely those of the author. This article is in part a response to Robert A. Levy, 
Pistol Whipped: Baseless Lawsuits, Foolish Laws, 10 J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2001). 
The author wishes to thank Allen Rostron and Francis Grab for their 
assistance in reviewing this article. 
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While this may seem a far-fetched hypothetical, there is no 
need to imagine such an industry. One already exists: the United 
States gun industry. The industry’s manufacturing process is 
subject to no federal safety or health oversight. It is not subject to 
any federal manufacturing regulations and only occasional state 
regulation.1 
Despite the tangible impact that the gun industry has on 
American society, the American public is largely unaware of the 
protected status afforded gun manufacturers under current 
regulations. The American public does not realize that 
domestically manufactured guns are exempt from any consumer 
product safety oversight. One poll showed that about half of 
respondents mistakenly believed that guns are regulated by 
federal safety standards.2 It is important for Americans to know 
this, and to understand that the gun industry uses a marketing and 
distribution system that knowingly funnels guns into the hands of 
                                                          
1 For example, Maryland and Massachusetts have enacted legislation 
regulating the sale and storage of firearms. See MD. CODE ANN., § 442(C)(c) 
(2002) (prohibiting a regulated firearm dealer from selling or transferring 
firearm until seven days from the time the application for purchase has been 
processed in triplicate and the original copy has been sent to the Secretary); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131L(a) (1998) (requiring that firearms be 
properly stored in a secured locked container or equipped with a safety device to 
render it inoperable by any person other than the authorized user). See also 
Stephen T. Bang, Crimes: Trigger Locks and Warning Labels on Firearms 
Become a Reality, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 265 (2000) (discussing California’s 
strict gun control laws); Anne-Marie White, A New Trend in Gun Control: 
Criminal Liability for the Negligent Storage of Firearms, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 
1389 (1993) (discussing state regulation of the gun industry and asserting that 
many state gun control laws are upheld as a reasonable exercise of the state’s 
police power). 
2 Susan B. Sorenson, Regulating Firearms as a Consumer Product, 286 
SCIENCE 1481, 1482 (1999) (polling awareness and opinions on gun safety 
issues among various groups and finding that 51.3% believed safety was already 
federally regulated and 19.1% did not know whether it was). This poll also 
found that the overall support for government regulations on the design of 
firearms, by percent, was 74.9% for design safety standards, 36.9% for suits 
against manufacturers, 38.5% for banning personal possession, 87.9% for child-
proofing and 72.2% for personalizing handguns. Id. 
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criminals.3 
Gun manufacturers have declared for decades that they bear 
no responsibility for the accidental use or criminal misuse of 
guns, refusing to include safety devices on their weapons or 
correct the distribution system that ensures easy criminal access 
to guns.4 Recent litigation by cities, municipalities, and one state, 
however, seeks to hold the industry accountable for failure to 
provide reasonably available safety devices that would save lives 
and failure to implement even minimal restrictions on the sale of 
its products to prevent easy access to guns by minors and 
criminals.5 
                                                          
3 See infra Part III (discussing the gun industry’s knowledge of an illicit 
gun market). 
4 See Wayne LaPierre, Vice-President of the National Rifle Association 
(NRA), Address at the NRA Annual Meeting of Members (May 1, 1999) 
(remarking that the NRA “has never agreed that magazine capacity has any 
relationship to the criminal misuse of firearms” and “there is no evidence 
waiting periods work.”), available at http://www.nrahq.org/transcripts/denver_ 
wlp.asp; see also National Rifle Association, NRA Gun Safety Rules, at 
http://www.nrahq.org/education/guide.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2002) (stating 
that rules for gun safety are to merely “[k]now your target and what is beyond[,] 
. . . [k]eep your finger off the trigger until ready to shoot . . . [and] [n]ever use 
alcohol or over-the-counter or other drugs before or while shooting[,]” but not 
indicating that gun manufacturers should have any role in gun safety). 
5 Litigation by states, cities and municipalities is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, and the plaintiffs’ pleading theories are relatively consistent. See 
Plaintiff’s Complaint, City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 2003 Ill. App. LEXIS 
276 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (No. 1-00-3541) (claiming that gun dealers, 
manufacturers and distributors engaged in conduct that constituted a nuisance in 
Cook County by knowingly exploiting the market for illegal guns and designing 
and manufacturing firearms to stimulate demand of illegal firearms); Plaintiff’s 
Complaint, Archer v. Arms Tech., Inc., 72 F.Supp.2d 784 (E.D. Mich. 1999) 
(No. 99-912658) (claiming that gun manufacture’s business practices are 
calculated to exploit the illegitimate firearms market and have adopted a strategy 
of willful blindness); Plaintiff’s Complaint, City of St. Louis v. Cernicek (Mo. 
Cir. Ct. 1999) (No. 992-01209) (claiming gun manufacturers and distributors 
created a public nuisance, conspired to engage in unlawful acts and negligently 
failed to develop safety devices); Plaintiff’s Complaint, City of New York v. 
Arms Tech., Inc. (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 1:00-cv-3641) (claiming that gun 
manufacturers failed to exercise control over production, marketing and 
distribution of guns, resulting in purchase of handguns by criminals and other 
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As Americans, we know the great devastation that guns cause 
in our country. Recent statistics indicate that from 1981 through 
1999, firearms caused 271,103 homicides, 337,954 suicides and 
26,294 unintentional deaths in the United States.6 Studies show 
that for each gun death in our country there are three gun 
injuries.7 
Guns take a particularly heavy toll on the nation’s young 
people, as highlighted by the horrific school shootings in 
                                                          
prohibited persons); Plaintiff’s Complaint, Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp. 785 
So.2d 1 (La. 2001) (No. 00-CA-1132) (claiming that gun manufacturers 
designed an unreasonably dangerous product, failed to include safety device and 
failed to provide adequate warnings in violation of the Louisiana Product 
Liability Act); First Amended Complaint, City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson 
(Mass. Super. Ct. 2000) (No. 1999-02590) (claiming gun manufacturers created 
a public nuisance, negligently distributed and marketed, defectively designed 
firearms and failed to warn); Plaintiff’s Complaint, State of N.Y. v. Arms Tech. 
Inc., No. 1-00-03641-JBW (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); Plaintiff’s Complaint, District 
of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. (D.C. Super. Ct. 2000) (No. 00-0000428) 
(claiming gun manufacturers violated public nuisance laws and negligently 
distributed firearms); Plaintiff’s Complaint, City of Atlanta v. Smith & Wesson 
Corp. (Fulton County Ct. 1999) (No. 99VS014917J) (claiming that gun 
manufacturers defectively and negligently design their products, and failed to 
include safety devices and adequate warnings); Plaintiff’s Complaint, People of 
California ex rel. Hahn v. Arcadia Machine & Tool (Cal. Super. Ct. 1999) (No. 
BC210894) (claiming gun manufacturers designed handguns to appeal to 
criminals and have increased production to meet demand from illegal market, 
and failed to incorporate feasible safety technology); Plaintiff’s Complaint, City 
of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 1999 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 27 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 
1999) (No.381897) (claiming gun manufacturers violated strict liability and 
created an unreasonable dangerous product, failed to warn and engaged in unfair 
and deceptive advertising practices). 
6 NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, MORTALITY DATA FROM THE NATIONAL VITAL 
STATISTICS SYSTEM (2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/major/ 
dvs/mortdata.htm. 
7 Joseph L. Annest et al., National Estimates of Non-fatal Firearm-Related 
Injuries: Beyond the Tip of the Iceberg, 273 JAMA 1751, 1751-54 (1995) 
(describing the magnitude and characteristics of nonfatal firearm-related injuries 
treated in hospital emergency departments, comparing nonfatal injury rates with 
firearm-related fatality rates and concluding that nonfatal firearm-related injuries 
contribute substantially to the overall public health burden of firearm-related 
injuries). 
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Paducah, Kentucky, Springfield, Oregon and Littleton, 
Colorado.8 Studies show that a teenager in the United States is 
more likely to die of a gunshot wound than from all “natural” 
causes combined.9 Between 1993 and 1998, there was an average 
22,000 nonfatal firearm injuries annually among people under 
20.10 One recent study shows that a statistically significant 
                                                          
8 See Lynda Gorov & Brian Macquarrie, Oregon Youth Warned of Trouble, 
BOSTON GLOBE, May 23, 1998 at A1 (detailing shooting at Springfield, Oregon 
school where 15-year old Kip Kinkle killed two students, injured 22 others and 
also killed his mother and father); Paul Hoversten, In Kentucky, “Blood was 
Everywhere,” Teens Dismissed Suspect’s Vow of “Something Big,” USA 
TODAY, Dec. 2, 1997 at 3A (describing Paducah, Kentucky school shooting by 
14-year old student, killing two and injuring six); Patrick O’Driscoll, Students 
Massacred in Colorado. Police Say 25 Killed; Shooters Stalked School on a 
“Suicide Mission,” USA TODAY, April 21, 1999 at 1A (discussing shooting by 
two high school students armed with high-powered rifles who took over school). 
9 LOIS A. FINGERHUT, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
ADVANCE DATA FROM THE NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS SYSTEM, FIREARM 
MORTALITY AMONG CHILDREN, YOUTH AND YOUNG ADULTS 1-34 YEARS OF 
AGE, TRENDS AND CURRENT STATUS, UNITED STATES: 1985-90 (1993) (finding 
that among black males 10 through 34 years of age, injuries from firearms are 
the leading cause of death), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/major/dvs/mortdata. 
htm. 
10 KAREN GOTSCH ET AL., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, SURVEILLANCE FOR FATAL AND NONFATAL FIREARM-RELATED 
INJURIES—UNITED STATES 1993-1998, 1-32 (Apr. 13, 2001), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5002a1.htm. The Centers for 
Disease Control found that from 1993 to 1998, an estimated average of 115,000 
firearm-related injuries, including 35,200 fatal and 79,400 nonfatal injuries, 
occurred annually in the United States. Males were seven times more likely to 
die or be treated in a hospital for a gunshot wound than females. The proportion 
of firearm-related injuries that resulted in death increased from younger to older 
age groups. Approximately 68% of firearm-related injuries for teenagers and 
young adults aged 15-24 years were from interpersonal violence and 78% of 
firearm-related injuries among older persons aged greater or equal to 65 years 
old were from intentionally self-inflicted gunshot wounds. Since 1993, firearm-
related injuries and deaths have been declining steadily. In 1998, however, 
firearm-related injuries remained the second leading cause of death in the United 
States, accounting for approximately 31,000 deaths. The majority of these fatal 
and nonfatal firearm-related injuries result from interpersonal violence and 
intentionally self-inflicted gunshot wounds, but approximately 15,000 
unintentional gunshot wounds are treated in U.S. hospital emergency 
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association exists between gun availability and elevated rates of 
suicide and homicide among children.11 Gun deaths and injuries 
not only cause American communities immense anguish and 
sorrow, they also exact a heavy financial toll on society. The 
burden borne by the American public as a result of gun violence 
is estimated at approximately $20 billion each year.12 
Addressing the costs and causes of gun violence requires a 
multi-faceted approach. The only regulation to date is on the sale 
of guns, and can be undermined, as manufacturers know, by 
savvy buyers. The Brady Bill, the most significant body of 
federal law on gun sales, established a five-day mandatory 
waiting period before the purchase of a firearm, required a 
background check to be made for any firearm purchase and 
created a national database to facilitate these background 
checks.13 While criminals and those who misuse or fail to 
                                                          
departments each year. Although firearm-related injuries represent less than 
0.5% of injuries treated in hospitals, they have an increased potential of death 
and hospitalization compared with other causes of injury. In 1994, treatment of 
gunshot injuries in the United States was estimated at $2.3 billion in lifetime 
medical costs, of which $1.1 billion was paid by the federal government. These 
factors emphasize the importance of firearm-related injuries as a public health 
concern. Id. 
11 Matthew Miller et al., Firearm Availability and Unintentional Firearm 
Deaths, Suicide and Homicide Among 5-14 Year Olds, 52 J. OF TRAUMA 267 
(2002) (finding that a disproportionately high number of 5-14 year olds died 
from suicide, homicide, and unintentional firearm wounds in states and regions 
where guns were more prevalent). 
12 See Linda Gunderson, The Financial Costs of Gun Violence, 131 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 483 (1999), available at http://www.annals.org/issues/ 
v131n6/full/199909210-00102.html. Gunderson states that because many 
victims of gun violence have no health insurance, taxpayers fund approximately 
85% of their medical costs. Id. Further, “[t]wo major factors contribute to the 
effect of gun violence on the overall costs of health care: the cost of long-term 
care for disabled victims and the cost of lost productivity.” Id. For example, of 
the $20 billion gun violence cost taxpayers, “$1.4 billion was solely for 
expenses related to health care, $1.6 billion was for injury-related illness and 
disability (lost productivity), and $17.4 billion was for premature death (lost 
productivity).” Id. 
13 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 
1543 (1993). The Brady Bill had its genesis in the 1981 shooting of James 
Brady by John Hinckley, Jr. during the unsuccessful attempted assassination of 
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adequately store firearms should be punished, those who 
manufacture and market guns should be held to the same 
standards of accountability as other manufacturers. The American 
taxpayer should not be left to foot the bill for foreseeable injuries 
caused by manufacturers’ irresponsible behavior. 
The industry’s abject failure to implement even the most basic 
of preventative measures is due in large part to the fact that the 
industry has been exempt from common law tort liability for too 
long.14 Despite knowledge that it contributes to the underground 
criminal gun market, and despite the ability to implement design 
and distribution changes that would stem the tide of guns into this 
market, the industry has taken no action.15 Since the rise of city 
                                                          
President Ronald Reagan. See Jill A. Tobia, The Brady Handgun Prevention 
Act: Does It Have a Shot at Success?, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 894, 898 
(1995). The final version of the legislation was passed twelve years and one 
president later. See Richard M. Aborn, The Battle Over the Brady Bill and the 
Future of Gun Control Advocacy, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 417, 420-28 (1995) 
(recounting the legislative process necessary for the passage of the Brady Bill). 
14 See, e.g., Timothy Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for 
Crime-Related Injuries: Defining a Suitable Role for the Tort System in 
Regulating the Firearms Industry, 65 MO. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2000). Lytton points 
out that only four suits against the industry have survived pretrial dismissal or 
summary judgment. He further notes that “to date, claims against gun 
manufacturers for crime-related injuries based on design defect theory have been 
dismissed for plaintiffs’ failure to allege a defect in the gun that caused it to 
malfunction.” Id. Ultimately, he concludes that this immunity of “gun 
manufacturers highlights the importance of non-economic concepts of wrong—
such as defect and breach of duty—in the adjudication of tort claims against gun 
manufacturers,” and argues that the reliance of economic analysis on complex 
statistical data, given the highly speculative nature of such data in gun cases, 
makes economic analysis unhelpful in finding workable answers to the questions 
posed by tort claims against firearms manufacturers. Id. 
15 See David Kairys, Legal Claims of Cities Against the Manufacturers of 
Handguns, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1998) Kairys states:  
 [t]he company and the industry as a whole are fully aware of the 
extent of the criminal misuse of firearms. The company and the 
industry are also aware that the black market in firearms is not simply 
the result of stolen guns but is due to the seepage of guns into the 
illicit market from multiple thousands of unsupervised federal 
firearms licensees. In spite of their knowledge, however, the industry 
position has consistently been to take no independent action to insure 
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suits against the gun industry, however, the special status enjoyed 
by the industry has begun to change.16 
Part I of this article debunks the arguments proffered by 
opponents of common sense gun regulations: that unregulated 
gun ownership actually helps reduce crime, and that any 
regulation of guns in the United States is an infringement on the 
Second Amendment. Next, Part II examines the fact that, despite 
studies indicating that guns are responsible for thousands of 
injuries and deaths in the United States each year, the industry 
enjoys a privileged status. The gun industry is specifically 
exempt from the most basic consumer product safety standards, 
and efforts are underway to further exempt the industry from 
basic common law tort claims. Part III discusses how the 
underground market in guns is regularly supplied by the gun 
industry and the ways in which the gun industry could implement 
simple, common sense design, marketing and distribution 
changes that would prevent gun sales to criminals, prevent child 
accidental shootings and help save lives. Lastly, Part IV 
examines minor changes the industry has made in response to the 
                                                          
responsible distribution practices. 
Id. 
16 See, e.g., Brian J. Siebel, City Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A 
Roadmap for Reforming Another Deadly Industry, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 
247, 248 (1999) (examining legal theories behind city-suit litigation against the 
gun industry). Law suits brought by cities have proceeded on theories that focus 
on three major areas of gun industry misconduct: “1) failing to incorporate 
feasible safety systems into guns that would prevent widespread firearm misuse 
by unauthorized users; 2) facilitating illegal gun trafficking by using a porous 
distribution system; and 3) deceptively advertising and overwhelming data 
indicating this lessens home safety.” Id. at 248. See also, Rachana Bhowmik, 
How State Attorneys General Can Act Now to Save Lives, Center to Prevent Gun 
Violence Legal Action Project (2001) (listing statewide gun safety measures and 
actions that public officials should take for gun safety regulation), available at 
http://www.gunlawsuits.org/pdfreports/targetingsafety.pdf; Ingrid Evans, City 
Lawsuits Against The Gun Industry Will Pressure Firearm Manufacturers to 
Design Safer Weapons and Sell Guns Responsibly (2001) (assessing the positive 
impact of municipal pressure on firearm manufacturers to incorporate safety 
features), at http://articles.corporate.findlaw.com/articles/file/00138/005491/ 
title/Subject/topic/Injury%20%20Tort%20Law_Products%20Liability/filename/
injurytortlaw_2_197. 
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on-going city-suit litigation. These suits have increased 
accountability and brought about the very same changes that the 
industry once claimed were both impractical and impossible. 
I. ARGUMENTS AGAINST LIABILITY 
Opponents of increased gun control and manufacturer liability 
advance myriad arguments to support their positions. Their 
conclusions, whether based in statistical or constitutional 
analysis, are fundamentally flawed. 
A. “More Guns Mean Less Crime”: Questionable Statistics 
Used to Argue Against Common Sense Gun Laws 
The gun industry and the National Rifle Association (“NRA”) 
regularly repeat the mantra “more guns mean less crime.”17 In 
his article “Pistol Whipped,” Robert Levy declares “the higher 
the number of carry permits in a state, the larger the drop [in 
crime].”18 These assertions are often based on research by 
American Enterprise Institute fellow John Lott, in conjunction 
with David Mustard.19 Their research showed that at the same 
time that states across the country enacted relaxed concealed 
weapons laws (“shall issue” laws), a national reduction in crime 
                                                          
17 See Wayne LaPierre, Address at the NRA Annual Meeting supra note 4 
(remarking that “We believe that a lawful, properly-permitted citizen who 
chooses to carry a concealed firearm not only deserves that right, but is a 
deterrent to crime. We support the right to carry because it has helped cut crime 
rates in all 31 states that have adopted it”). 
18 Robert A. Levy, Pistol Whipped: Baseless Lawsuits, Foolish Laws, 10 
J.L. & POL’Y 1, 40 (2001) (citing John Lott’s research as proof that “[l]aws 
permitting the carrying of concealed handguns reduce murder by about 8% and 
rape by about 5%”). 
19 John R. Lott Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right to 
Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1997) (utilizing a cross-
section of crime data for U.S. counties from 1977 to 1992, the authors found that 
states allowing citizens the right to carry concealed weapons deterred violent 
crimes and predicted that other states would have experienced a drop in violent 
crime had they adopted such a provision). 
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occurred.20 From that fact, they erroneously determined that the 
carrying of firearms among the general population causes a 
reduction in crime.21 Analyzing county-level crime data for the 
years 1977 to 1992, and relying upon statistical regressions of 
select datasets, Lott and Mustard concluded that the relaxation of 
concealed weapons laws deterred violent crimes, increased 
property crimes due to criminal substitution and had no effect 
upon the number of accidental deaths.22 They also claimed that, 
“[their] evidence implies that concealed handguns are the most 
cost-effective method of reducing crime thus far analyzed by 
economists, providing a higher return than increased law 
enforcement or incarceration, other private security devices, or 
social programs like early educational intervention.”23 
Lott and Mustard’s bold assertions led researchers to re-
examine their data.24 While the gun lobby and its supporters have 
                                                          
20 See Lott & Mustard, supra note 19, at 64. “Shall issue” concealed 
weapons laws allow practically all non-felons to carry concealed handguns. 
These laws are characterized as “non-discretionary” because the buyer is not 
required to demonstrate a need to carry a concealed firearm when applying for a 
concealed carry permit. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3112 (2002); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-309 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.06 (2002); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3 (West 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 
2003 (West 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.425b (West 2002); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 400.00 (McKinney 2002); with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7b17 
(2001) (requiring that applicants demonstrate the need to carry a firearm in order 
to protect life or property); N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-04-03 (2001) (stating that 
applicants must have a valid reason for carrying a concealed weapon such as 
self-protection, protection of others or work-related needs); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
1953 53-5-704 (2002) (establishing that permits shall be issued for the purpose 
of “lawful self defense”). 
21 Lott & Mustard, supra note 19, at 64. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 65. 
24 See, e.g., Daniel Webster & Jens Ludwig, Myths about Defensive Gun 
Use and Permissive Gun Carry Law (1999) (describing problems with Lott and 
Mustard’s data such as variations in the estimated effects in their studies (8-
67%), failure to account for other important factors, which affect state crime and 
homicide rates and the absence of expected effects, for example, the small effect 
of “shall carry” laws on robberies), at http://www.jhsph.edu/gunpolicy/ 
myths.pdf; Franklin Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Concealed Handguns: The 
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since quoted Lott and Mustard’s thesis as fact, they fail to 
acknowledge the numerous critical reviews of Lott and Mustard’s 
assertions which reveal either that concealed weapons laws have 
no effect on crime or, worse, that more guns equal more crime.25 
Researchers Daniel Webster and Jens Ludwig pointed out 
that, “errors aside, the fundamental problem with Lott’s research 
can be summarized by the old science adage ‘correlation is not 
causation.’ Variables may be related to one another yet not cause 
one another.”26 Professor Franklin Zimring,27 determined that the 
datasets used in the Lott-Mustard Study included inherent biases 
that resulted in skewed results.28 Even Gary Kleck, an author 
whose own data regarding defensive gun usage is regularly used 
to argue against gun safety measures, is skeptical of Lott’s 
numbers.29 Kleck remarked that the Lott-Mustard results: 
                                                          
Counterfeit Deterrent, 7 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 46, 49-50 (1997) (finding 
“insurmountable methodological flaws” in Lott’s study). 
25 See, e.g., Levy, supra note 18, at 40-41 (relying on Lott and Mustard’s 
data without acknowledging methodological criticism). 
26 Webster & Ludwig, supra note 24 (asserting arguments prepared for the 
“Strengthening the Public Health Debate on Handguns, Crime and Safety” 
meeting in October 1999, and clarifying that it would be erroneous to attribute 
differences in crime rate to the presence of permissive concealed-carry laws 
without considering other unmeasured differences). 
27 Professor Franklin Zimring is the William G. Simon Professor of Law 
and Director of the Earl Warren Legal Institute at the University of California, 
Berkeley. His co-author Professor Gordon Hawkins teaches at the Institute of 
Criminology, University of Sydney. Id. 
28 Many of Lott’s strongest critics believe that his work has stepped over 
the line of academic research into policy advocacy, which may have dulled his 
attentiveness to disconfirming evidence. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 24, at 
49-50. The authors noted that “[a]s a gauge of his blind belief in the power of 
concealed weapons, following the March 1998 Jonesboro massacre, Lott . . . 
argued in a Wall Street Journal op-ed that the best way to prevent such 
shootings was to arm teachers. Id. Wrote Lott, ‘[a]llowing teachers and other 
law-abiding adults to carry concealed handguns in schools would not only make 
it easier to stop shootings in progress, it could also help deter shootings from 
ever occurring.’” Id. 
29 GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 372 
(1997) (suggesting that Lott and Mustard’s conclusion that “shall carry” laws 
reduce crime and deter prospective criminals may be overstated because “if 
those who got permits were merely legitimizing what they were already doing 
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could be challenged, in light of how modest the 
intervention was. The 1.3% of the population in places 
like Florida who obtained permits would represent at best 
only a slight increase in the share of potential crime 
victims who carry guns in public places. . . . More likely, 
the declines in crime coinciding with relaxation of carry 
laws were largely attributable to other factors not 
controlled in the Lott and Mustard analysis.30 
Even David Mustard, co-author of the Lott-Mustard study, 
admitted that the study did not include all factors that may have 
affected the decline in crime rates during the time period 
examined.31 
Most researchers agree that the methods of the Lott-Mustard 
study were not scientifically sound.32 For example, the American 
Journal of Public Health published a criticism of the Lott-
Mustard study highlighting significant flaws in the study, 
including “misclassification of gun-carrying laws, endogeneity of 
predictor variables, omission of confounding variables, and 
failure to control for the cyclical nature of crime trends.”33 These 
                                                          
before the new laws, it would mean there was no increase at all in carrying or in 
actual risks to criminals.”). 
30 Id. at 372. See also Albert W. Alschuler, Two Guns, Four Guns, Six 
Guns, More Guns: Does Arming the Public Reduce Crime?, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 
365, 367 (1997) (discussing the faults of regression analysis as a methodology 
and noting discrepancies in the Lott-Mustard study, such as finding a negative 
correlation between murder, burglary, rape and large versus small cities). 
31 See Klein v. Simon Leis , 767 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (stating 
some of the variables not included in the study, such as family structure or wide 
spread state or county prison sentences). Mustard also conceded that “some 
experts in his field disagreed with his methodology, and that reasonable people 
might differ on the efficacy of various concealed-carry laws.” Id. at 296. 
32 See, e.g., ROBERT EHRLICH, NINE CRAZY IDEAS IN SCIENCE, A FEW 
MIGHT EVEN BE TRUE 32 (2000); Dan A. Black & Daniel S. Nagin, Do Right-
to-Carry Laws Deter Violent Crime?, 27 J. LEGAL. STUD. 209, 214 (1998); 
Daniel W. Webster et al., Flawed Gun Policy Research Could Endanger Public 
Safety, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 918, 918-21 (1997). 
33 Webster et al., supra note 32, at 918-22. The authors criticized the 
methodology of the Lott-Mustard study, noting that the study attempted to 
classify the “shall issue” laws into two neat categories, without consideration of 
those falling somewhere in between. Id. This caused serious problems for their 
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flaws were so “substantial” that the researchers stated, “any 
conclusions about the effects of shall-issue laws based on this 
study are dubious at best.”34 Researchers Dan Black and Daniel 
Nagin reviewed Lott and Mustard’s data and determined that:  
their results are highly sensitive to small changes in their 
model and sample. Without Florida in their sample, there 
is no detectable impact of right-to-carry laws on the rate 
of murder and rape, the two crimes that by the 
calculations of Lott and Mustard account for 80 percent of 
the social benefit of right-to-carry laws.35 
Professor Robert Erhlich of George Mason University 
debunked Lott’s myth and gave Lott’s theories “three cuckoos” 
on a crazy scale of four cuckoos.36 
Moreover, the conclusions of several independent studies 
directly contradict the Lott-Mustard thesis.37 Researchers Ian 
Ayers and John Donahue published a study in the Journal of 
American Law and Economics using the same trends analyzed by 
Lott and Mustard and found that the implementation of “shall 
                                                          
classification scheme. Additionally, the authors assert that Lott and Mustard 
failed to control the complex relationship between “shall issue” laws, arrests and 
the crime rate. Id. The authors also point out that Lott and Mustard failed to 
explain deviations between the crime rate and other trends and incorporated no 
techniques for controlling other unexplained fluctuations, like poverty or 
changes in the criminal justice system. Id. 
34 Id. at 920. 
35 Black & Nagin, supra note 32, at 214 (reanalyzing the data collected by 
Lott and Mustard and concluding that no definitive inference or conclusion of a 
deterrent effect can be drawn when a single state is removed from the data 
sample). 
36 See EHRLICH, supra note 32, at 32. Ehrlich challenges Lott’s assertion 
that both violent and non-violent crime decrease with increased rates of gun-
ownership because Lott neglected other variable in his analysis. For example, 
those states with a high rural population are likely to have lower crime rates as 
well as higher gun ownership. Id. The author also suggests that Lott’s contention 
regarding decreases in crimes due to non-discretionary gun laws is less 
persuasive when Lott adjusted his regression analysis to take account of rates of 
change and not merely absolute crimes rates. Id. 
37 EHRLICH, supra note 32, at 32; Lott & Mustard, supra note 19, at 1. See 
also Black & Nagin, supra note 32, at 209; Webster et al., supra note 32, at 918-
21. 
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issue” concealed carry permit laws actually increased the rates of 
crime and violence.38 Similarly, research conducted by 
University of Chicago economics Professor Mark Duggan 
discovered that increases in gun ownership rates directly 
correlate with increases in gun crimes.39 Duggan specifically 
concluded that, correcting for improper variables, the Lott-
Mustard research is incorrect.40 
The gun lobby and its supporters are similarly fond of 
quoting unreliable self-defense statistics.41 Gary Kleck estimates 
that civilians use guns in self-defense some 2.5 million times a 
year.42 While these numbers have been oft-cited by the NRA and 
other opponents of gun safety measures,43 these number are based 
                                                          
38 Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Nondiscretionary Concealed Weapons 
Laws: A Case Study of Statistics, Standards of Proof, and Public Policy, 1 AM. 
L. & ECON. REV. 436, 436-70 (1999) (concluding that “[at] the end of the day, 
we are concerned that Lott’s estimated coefficients for adopting states are not as 
robust as he claims and may be seriously biased because of omitted explanatory 
variables.”), available at http://islandia.law.yale.edu/ ayers/pdf/lottreview.pdf. 
39 Mark Duggan, More Guns, More Crime, 109 J. POL. ECON. 1086, 1089 
(2001). Estimating annual rates of gun ownership at both the state and the county 
levels during the past two decades, Duggan demonstrates that changes in gun 
ownership are significantly positively related to changes in the homicide rate, 
with this relationship driven almost entirely by an impact of gun ownership on 
murders in which a gun is used. Id. The effect of gun ownership on all other 
crime categories is much less marked. Id. Recent reductions in the fraction of 
households owning a gun can explain one-third of the differential decline in gun 
homicides relative to non-gun homicides since 1993. Id. 
40 Id. at 1086. 
41 See Levy, supra note 18, at 42 (asserting that evidence suggests armed 
civilians in fact deter crime, and that proposed gun regulations will “strip law-
abiding citizens of their most effective means of self-defense”). 
42 Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence 
and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 
167 (1995) (discussing research methodology and survey results showing that 
there are 2.2 – 2.5 million self-defense uses of guns a year in the United States). 
43 Paul H. Backman, Armed Citizens and CrimeControl, National Rifle 
Association Institute for Legislative Action, at http://www.nraila.org/media/ 
misc/Blackman.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2002) (citing Kleck & Gertz, supra 
note 42, at 167 in part for the premise that “firearms are used for self-protection 
about 2.5 million times annually”). 
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on self-reporting surveys and are grossly over-estimated.44 The 
Kleck study projects a number of assailants wounded by armed 
citizens in 1992 that is more than double the estimate from 
another study of the total number of people treated for gunshot 
wounds in a nationally representative sample of hospitals in 
1994.45 In his efforts to externally validate Kleck’s estimate, 
researcher David Hemenway discovered that there were several 
problems with the Kleck study.46 Among those problems are 
difficulties in estimating a rare event and conflicts due to social 
desirability or personal presentation bias, whereby surveyed 
individuals misrepresent information because of the desire to 
“look good.”47 
Despite this substantial body of research challenging such 
statistics and conclusions, critics of gun safety laws and city-suit 
litigation repeatedly rely upon these controversial studies to 
justify not holding the gun industry responsible for their negligent 
behavior.48 Once these flawed calculations are laid aside, 
                                                          
44 See Kleck & Gertz, supra note 42, at 167. 
45 Webster & Ludwig, supra note 24, at 7 (arguing that more guns will lead 
to more deaths). 
46 See David Hemenway, The Myth of Millions of Annual Self-Defense Gun 
Uses: A Case Study of Survey Overestimates of Rare Events, 10 CHANCE 3, 6 
(1997). 
47 See id. One methodology flaw in Kleck’s survey was that participants 
were posed questions in contexts where they were likely to misrepresent 
information in the hopes of “looking good.” For example, if they purchased a 
gun for self-defense purposes they will want to claim they used the gun for self-
defense so that their intended use was realized. Id. 
48 See, e.g., Levy, supra note 18, at 12-16 (arguing that the Second 
Amendment protects the rights of individuals to keep arms against tyranny); 
Lott & Mustard, supra note 19, at 1. See also H. Sterling Burnett, Suing Gun 
Manufacturers: Hazardous to Our Health, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 433 (2001) 
(stating that societal benefits stemming from policies allowing less regulated 
gun use outweigh associated costs and therefore gun use should not be regulated 
in the ways suggested by several pending lawsuits against the gun industry). See 
generally Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for the Sale of Non-defective 
Products: An Analysis and Critique of the Concept of Negligent Marketing, 53 
S.C. L. REV. 907 (2002) (identifying the theories of negligence on which 
lawsuits against gun manufactures are based); Symposium, Guns and Liability 
in America, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1425 (2000) (discussing and debating issues of 
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however, one central truth emerges: Americans suffer from 
unreasonable levels of gun violence and something must be done 
to curb the epidemic of gun violence in our nation. 
B. “The Right to Keep and Bear Arms”: Debunking the Myth 
that the Second Amendment Prohibits Common Sense 
Gun Safety Laws 
The interpretation and application of the Second Amendment 
is a hotly debated issue.49 The Amendment reads “[a] well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, 
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”50 
Robert Levy of the CATO institute contends that the Second 
Amendment “protects. . . each individual against the state.”51 
With no supporting evidence, he argues that “disarmed societies 
tend to become police states”52 and maintains “the individual 
rights view [of the Second Amendment] establishes a 
                                                          
and relationships between gun safety policy, statistical studies, state laws, and 
pending lawsuits). 
49 See generally, Symposium on the Second Amendment: Fresh Looks: The 
Second Amendment in Context: the Case of the Vanishing Predicate, 76 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 403 (2000) (describing the controversy between the “individual 
rights” interpretation of the Second Amendment and the position that the 
Amendment was adopted to assure the states’ control over their local militias 
only). Compare Todd Barnet, Gun “Control” Laws Violate the Second 
Amendment and May Lead to Higher Crime Rates, 63 MO. L. REV. 155 (1998) 
(arguing that the Second Amendment creates an individual right to bear arms for 
personal protection, as opposed to a collective right, to bear arms and suggesting 
that gun regulation may increase crime rates), with Harold S. Herd, Re-
Examination of the Firearms Regulation Debate and Its Consequences, 36 
WASHBURN L.J. 196 (1997) (applying a textual analysis to the Second 
Amendment, and concluding that right to bear arms is a qualified one, 
recognized only in the context of the “people” forming a “well regulated 
Militia” to protect the security of the free states, and clearly does not provide for 
an individual right to bear arms independent of the “militia” clause). 
50 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
51 See Levy, supra note 18, at 13. 
52 Id. 
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presumption against gun control.”53 According to former Chief 
Justice Warren Burger, however, Robert Levy and other 
opponents of gun safety legislation continue to perpetrate a 
“fraud” on the American people when they argue that 
implementing or enforcing gun safety legislation upon the gun 
industry is prohibited by the Second Amendment.54 Indeed, the 
Second Amendment Foundation filed suit against mayors whose 
cities brought cases against the gun industry, citing a 
“conspiracy” and a violation of Second Amendment rights.55 
Although the case was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, it 
illustrates just how far gun advocates will go to perpetuate the 
“fraud.”56 
Contrary to gun lobbyists’ repeated assertions, the Second 
Amendment poses no barrier to reasonable gun safety laws.57 In 
                                                          
53 Robert Levy, Bearing Arms in D.C., LEGAL TIMES, July 22, 2002 at 42. 
54 McNeil-Lehrer Newshour (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 16, 1991) 
(establishing that Justice Berger was in support of gun control legislation which 
would impose a “thirty day waiting period so they could find out why this 
person needs a handgun or a machine gun.”). See Dick Stitz, Handgun Debate: 
Who’s Really Trying to Save Lives Here?, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 7, 1993, at 2 
(referring to Burger’s comment on television on Dec. 16, 1991 that the NRA’s 
promotions about the Second Amendment have “been the subject of one of the 
greatest pieces of ‘fraud’ on the American people by special interest groups that 
I have ever seen in my lifetime.”). 
55 See Second Amendment Found. v. U.S. Conference of Mayors, 274 F.3d 
521 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The Second Amendment Foundation brought civil 
conspiracy claims against the mayors of 22 cities that filed public nuisance 
actions against gun manufacturers and dealers. Id. The Second Amendment 
Foundation is an organization of firearm consumers dedicated to using legal 
action to protect “our Constitutional heritage to own firearms.” See Second 
Amendment Foundation, The SAF Web Site, http://www.saf.org (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2002). 
56 Second Amendment Found., 274 F.3d at 524. The district court dismissed 
the claims, concluding that the firearm consumers had not made the prima facie 
showing of personal jurisdiction because their allegations that the mayors 
conspired together represented nothing more than a legal conclusion. Id. The 
fact that multiple cities filed suit did not establish that the mayors had entered a 
conspiratorial agreement at the mayoral meeting because some cities had filed 
suit before that meeting. Id. 
57 While many special interest groups maintain that the Second 
Amendment is an absolute bar to any regulation of firearms, this is not the case. 
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fact, the Second Amendment does not necessarily provide an 
individual with the right to bear arms.58 The Supreme Court 
stated more than sixty years ago that the Second Amendment was 
designed “to assure the continuation and render possible the 
effectiveness” of the state militia and the Amendment “must be 
interpreted and applied with that end in view.”59 The federal 
courts have consistently echoed the view that the Second 
Amendment merely guarantees a right to be armed to those 
persons using the arms to serve in an organized state militia.60 
                                                          
See Sayoko Blodgett-Ford, The Changing Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 6 
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 101, 173-87 (1995). The most important gun 
legislation passed in the recent past is the Brady Handgun Prevention Act. Pub. 
L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1543 (1993). See also supra note 13 and 
accompanying text; Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (restricting transfer and purchase of 
semi-automatic assault weapons). 
58 See Rachana Bhowmik, Our Second Amendment Rights Are Not Eroded, 
but Our Understanding of Them Is, CHURCH & SOCIETY, May/June 2000 
(characterizing the Second Amendment as not granting an individual right to 
bear arms independent of the “militia” clause and asserting that an unfortunate 
and “unrelenting campaign of misinformation by the N.R.A. whose opposition 
to any regulations on firearms in this country has given much of the American 
public a warped understanding of the Second Amendment.”). See also Wendy 
Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism: On 
Sanford Levinson’s The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 661 
(1989) (explaining why the Second Amendment should be interpreted against 
providing an individual with the right to bear arms); Anthony Gallia, Your 
Weapons, You Will not Need Them, 33 AKRON L. REV. 131 (1999) (examining 
the history of the Second Amendment, and discussing the ambiguity in whether 
the Second Amendment grants individuals the right to bear arms); Andrew D. 
Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction of 
Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U.L. REV. 57 (1997) (stating that “the individual 
right to bear arms for all legal purposes” is a “myth[ ] created by the gun 
lobby”). 
59 U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding that the Second 
Amendment does not guarantee private citizens the right to keep and transport 
shotguns since it was not part of any ordinary military equipment and its use 
could not contribute to the common defense). 
60 See, e.g., U.S. v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 402 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
Second Amendment’s right to bear arms applies only to the right of the State to 
maintain a militia); Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 102 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 912 (1996) (holding that the Second Amendment does not 
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Erwin Griswold, Solicitor General to former President Nixon and 
former Dean of Harvard Law School, declared, “that the Second 
Amendment poses no barrier to strong gun laws is perhaps the 
most well-settled proposition in American Constitutional Law.”61 
When the Second Amendment was drafted, most states were 
                                                          
grant an individual right to be armed); U.S. v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 896 (1997) (concluding that there is a “well 
regulated militia” requirement for protection under the Second Amendment); 
U.S. v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996) (upholding firearms regulation 
against Second Amendment challenges), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 807 (1997); 
Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 813 
(1995) (holding that the Second Amendment does not confer an absolute right to 
bear any type of firearm); U.S. v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1120 (8th Cir. 1992), 
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 997 (1993) (stating that to succeed on a Second 
Amendment violation claim, claimant must prove possession of a firearm was 
reasonably related to a well regulated militia); U.S. v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115,128 
(2d Cir. 1984) (recognizing that in absence of “some reasonable relationship to 
the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,” the right to posses a 
gun is not a fundamental right); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d. 
261 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding a village ban on handguns against Second 
Amendment challenges); U.S. v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978) (asserting that the purpose of the Second 
Amendment is only to preserve effectiveness and assure continuation of state 
militia and did not preserve a right to keep unregistered firearms in the home 
merely because he is technically a member of the Kansas militia); U.S. v. 
Johnson, 441 F.2d 1134, 1136 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that the Second 
Amendment only guarantees the right to bear arms in some reasonable 
relationship to a militia). 
61 Neil A. Lewis, At the Bar: In the Constitutional Amendment on the Right 
to Bear Arms, One Clause Defines a Cause, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1995, at B18 
(declaring that the Second Amendment protects rights of states to arm militias). 
See also BRADY CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, SECOND AMENDMENT 
MYTH AND MEANING, available at http://www.gunlawsuits.org/defend/second/ 
articles/mythandmean.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2003). Griswold contended: 
 to assert that the Constitution is a barrier to reasonable gun laws, in 
the face of the unanimous judgment of the federal courts to the 
contrary, exceeds the limits of principled advocacy. It is time for the 
NRA and its followers in Congress to stop trying to twist the Second 
Amendment from a reasoned, if antiquated, empowerment for a 
militia into a bulletproof personal right for anyone to wield deadly 
weaponry beyond legislative control.” 
Id. 
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concerned chiefly with maintaining a viable state militia to defend 
the state against possible invasion.62 As the framers understood it, 
a “militia” was “an organized, state-sponsored group of 
individuals acting in defense of the whole.”63 Further, the 
Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o provide for 
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for 
governing such part of them as may be employed in the Service 
of the United States.”64 This grant of power necessarily implies 
governmental organization of the group. Alexander Hamilton 
acknowledged that, because a truly “well-regulated militia” 
would require frequent “military exercises and evolutions,” such 
a requirement would be a “serious public inconvenience and 
loss.”65 Hamilton believed a more reasonable approach would be 
to ensure that militia members were “properly armed and 
equipped” and to “assemble them once or twice in the course of a 
                                                          
62 See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 708 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (recognizing the 
importance of the Second Amendment and elaborating that a militia is “the 
natural defense of a free country against sudden foreign invasions, domestic 
insurrections, and domestic usurpations of power by rulers); Saul Cornell, 
Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, the Second Amendment, 
and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16 CONST. 
COMMENTARY 221, 299 (1999) (discussing Pennsylvania’s “right to bear arms” 
within context of the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); Richard 
Uviller & William G. Merkel, The Second Amendment in Context: The Case of 
the Vanishing Predicate, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403, 509 (2000) (discussing the 
framers’ desire to preserve local power and commenting that the [Second] 
Amendment is concerned with preserving “states’ capacities to defend 
themselves against disorder, insurrection, and invasion”). 
63 See Steven J. Heyman, Symposium on the Second Amendment: Fresh 
Looks: Natural Rights and the Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 237, 
263 (2000) (discussing Virginia Bill of Rights which served as model for bill of 
rights and the right to arm the militia). See also Uviller & Merkel, supra note 62, 
at 552 (citing the consensus among scholars that the founding generation of 
Americans conceived of a militia as “a group . . . responding as needed for the 
common defense”). 
64 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
65 THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, at 184 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). 
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year.”66 Similarly, James Madison described militia as a group of 
citizens “united and conducted by governments possessing their 
affections and confidence.”67 
That the framers selected the phrase “bear arms” further 
illustrates the military connotations of the Second Amendment. 
To “bear arms” means possession of weapons for military use.68 
As historian Garry Wills stated, “one does not bear arms against 
a rabbit.”69 Indeed, both historical and contemporary definitions 
of the word “arms” have a distinctly military connotation; the 
term “arms” refers to instruments of war.70 Accordingly, the 
Second Amendment was not meant to protect the rights of 
hunters or sportsmen, but was purely a means of protecting a 
state’s right to maintain an organized armed force. 
In addition to the historical definition of the terms “militia” 
and “bear arms,” we must understand why the Second 
                                                          
66 See id. at 185. 
67 THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 299 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
68 See U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 176 (1939) (“In the absence of any 
evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of 
less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship 
to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that 
the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an 
instrument.”); U.S. v. Graham, 305 F.3d 1094, 1106 (10th Cir. 2002) (“We have 
previously held that a federal weapons restriction ‘does not violate the Second 
Amendment unless it impairs the state’s ability to maintain a well-regulated 
militia,’ and that the right to bear arms is a collective rather than individual 
right.”); U.S. v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1273 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The concerns 
motivating the creation of the Second Amendment convince us that the 
amendment was intended to protect only the use or possession of weapons that 
is reasonably related to a militia actively maintained and trained by the states.”). 
See also MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1993) 
(defining “bear arms” as “1: to carry or possess arms and 2: to serve as a 
soldier”), available at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary. 
69 Gary Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Sept. 21, 
1995, at 62 (debunking the myth that the Second Amendment protects the rights 
of individuals to be armed). 
70 See AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 74 (3rd ed. 1993) 
(defining “arm” as “a weapon, esp. a firearm.”). See also supra note 60 
(discussing case law providing contemporary definitions of “arms). 
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Amendment was passed. It is important to remember that the 
Constitution was drafted for a then untested federal power. Out 
of concern for a possible abuse of power by the federal 
government, the framers drafted the Bill of Rights to amend the 
Constitution “in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its 
powers.”71 The debates among the states reflected a fear that 
giving Congress excessive power over the militia would enable 
Congress not only to regulate the militia, but also to disarm it 
completely, leaving the states defenseless against the federal 
government.72 In this sense, the state militias were thought to 
function as the “bulwarks of liberties.”73 The state militias were 
properly preserved in the Bill of Rights as an important 
mechanism to enforce limits on the federal government. 
Despite this well-established proposition, one recent aberrant 
decision has garnered significant media and public attention.74 In 
                                                          
71 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION 
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 338 (Jonathon Eliot ed., 1836) (Resolutions of 
the First Congress in March 4, 1789); see also DAVID E. YOUNG, ORIGIN OF THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT 10 (Golden Oaks Books 1995). 
72 See Cornell, supra note 62, at 299 (providing a good overview of the 
various historical state concerns in regards to overreaching by the federal 
government in the context of the Second Amendment). See also THE 
FEDERALIST Nos. 17 (A. Hamilton), 39, 45, 46 (J. Madison) (asserting view that 
the Framers endorsed strong state governments); Robert J. Spitzer, Symposium 
on the Second Amendment: Fresh Looks: Lost and Found: Researching the 
Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 349 (2000) (stating that “the Second 
Amendment was added to allay the concerns of Anti-federalists and others who 
feared that state sovereignty . . . would be impinged or neglected by the new 
federal government, which had been given vast new powers, particularly and 
alarmingly over the use of military force”). Id. at 351. 
72 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION 
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 400 (Jonathan Eliot ed., 1836) (statement by 
Gov. Randolph). 
73 Id. 
74 U.S. v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d and rem’d, 
270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001); pet’n for reh’g denied, 281 F.3d 1281 (5th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 2002 U.S. Lexis 4269 (U.S. June 10, 2002). But see U.S. v. 
Lewis, 236 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 2001) (refusing to apply Emerson and finding that 
the Second Amendment does not provide an individual right to bear arms); U.S. 
v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding finding that Second 
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U.S. v. Emerson, the district court for the Northern District of 
Texas rejected federal court precedent and held that a federal law 
prohibiting an individual under a domestic restraining order from 
possessing a firearm violates that individual’s Second 
Amendment right.75 The defendant, Timothy Joe Emerson, 
threatened his estranged wife and child with a firearm and 
threatened to kill his estranged wife’s friends.76 On appeal, the 
Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision in part, and, 
contrary to every other appellate court in the country, found that 
the Second Amendment does provide an individual right to keep 
firearms.77 But the Fifth Circuit found that the indictment did not 
violate that right and reversed the decision overturning the 
indictment.78 The court went to great lengths to cite recent 
scholarship to support this novel decision on the Second 
Amendment.79 In a strongly worded special concurrence, Judge 
                                                          
Amendment does not protect individual’s right to keep and bear arms); U.S. v. 
Baer, 235 F.3d 561 (10th Cir. 2000) (refusing to apply Emerson’s conclusion 
that the Second Amendment protects rights of individuals to keep arms). 
75 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (holding that the federal statute under which 
defendant was indicted was unconstitutional since the defendant’s right under 
the Second Amendment was violated because the statute did not require any 
particularized finding of the threat of future violence by defendant toward his 
spouse or child). 
76 See Ann LoLordo, A Small-Town Doctor Caught in the Cross Fire, 
BALTIMORE SUN, May 30, 2000, at 1A (describing the case where a doctor had 
gun in violation of a state restraining order and allegedly pointed it at his ex-
wife in the presence of his daughter). 
77 See Emerson, 270 F.3d at 203. 
78 Id. at 261. The Fifth Circuit held that, under Texas law, a restraining 
order could not have been properly issued unless the issuing court concluded, 
based on adequate evidence at a hearing, that the party restrained would have 
otherwise posed a realistic threat of imminent physical injury to the protected 
party. Id. In such a case, the court concluded that the nexus between firearm 
possession by the husband and the threat of lawless violence was sufficient to 
support the deprivation, while the order remained in effect, of the husband’s 
Second Amendment rights. Id. 
79 Id. at 227 (citing various scholarship produced by prolific individual 
rights professors such as Nelson Lund and Steven Halbrook to support their 
conclusion that the framers designed the Second Amendment to guarantee an 
individual’s right to arms for self-defense). 
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Robert M. Parker refused to join the panel opinion on the Second 
Amendment, stating that “it is dicta and is therefore not binding 
on us or any other court.”80 
Apart from the Fifth Circuit’s flouting of precedent, one 
central truth remains: no federal appellate court has overturned 
any form of gun regulation on the basis of the Second 
Amendment.81 Indeed, despite the gun lobby’s campaigns 
decrying the erosion of the Second Amendment, the NRA 
abandoned attempts to use the Second Amendment as a legal 
basis for challenging gun safety laws.82 They deserted this 
argument, realizing that the federal courts have long been in 
agreement that the Second Amendment does not prohibit 
reasonable regulation of firearms.83 
                                                          
80 Id. at 273. Judge Parker stated: 
 whether ‘the district court erred in adopting an individual rights or 
standard model as the basis for its construction of the Second 
Amendment’ is not a question that affects the outcome of this case no 
matter how it is answered. In holding that § 922(g)(8) is not infirm as 
to Emerson, and at the same time finding an individual right to gun-
ownership, the majority today departs from these sound precepts of 
judicial restraint. 
Id. 
81 See supra note 74 (citing cases finding that gun regulations did not 
violate the Second Amendment). 
82 Compare Oefinger v. Baker, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18370 (D.C. Cir. 
1986). (dismissing as unripe a case filed by the NRA as plaintiff-inventor 
challenging a ban on machine guns, claiming violation of Second Amendment), 
with Olympic Arms v. Buckles, 301 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 1999), rev’g, N.R.A. v. 
Magaw, 909 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (dismissing for lack of standing a 
suit filed by the NRA claiming violations of due process, equal protection and of 
the Commerce Clause). 
83 See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (challenging the Gun Free 
School Zone Act under the Tenth Amendment, rather than the Second 
Amendment); U.S. v. Murphy, 53 F.3d 93 (5th Cir. 1995) (claiming the Gun 
Free School Zone Act was outside Congressional power under the Commerce 
Clause). See also Fraternal Order of Police v. U.S., 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (arguing that amendments to the Gun Control Act of 1968 violate the 
substantive due process guarantee of the Fifth Amendment by “unnecessarily 
and irrationally burdening important individual interests in possession of a 
firearm in the public interest, in serving the community, and in pursuing an 
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II. AN INDUSTRY EXEMPT: HOW THE GUN INDUSTRY HAS 
MANAGED TO EVADE OVERSIGHT 
Despite Robert Levy’s claims that the gun industry is 
“friendless,”84 this industry’s ability to influence federal 
legislation and policy reveals its tremendous power and 
influence.85 One of the gun industry’s greatest allies is the NRA, 
an organization whose hostility toward federal intervention is 
evinced by its vice president’s reference to federal officers as 
“jack-booted thugs.”86 The NRA has successfully influenced 
federal legislation and worked to protect the gun industry from 
any significant federal oversight.87 For example, when Congress 
                                                          
established career.”). 
84 See Levy, supra note 18, at 1 (claiming that the city lawsuits against the 
gun industry are an attempt “to exact tribute from friendless industries.”). 
85 See Jake Tapper, Guns and Money, SALON.COM (Aug. 11, 1999) 
(focusing on the financial contributions of the gun industry to the Bush 
campaign as a method of influencing gun control policy), http://salon.com/news/ 
feature/1999/08/11/gun/index.html. 
86 Threats to Federal Law Enforcement Officers: Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight, 106th Cong. (May 16, 2000) 
(statement of Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy, Member, S. Judiciary Comm.), 
available at http://www.senate.gov/~judiciary/oldsite/51620pjl.htm. In April 
1995 NRA vice president Wayne La Pierre sent a fund-raising letter to NRA 
members calling Federal law enforcement officers “jack-booted thugs” who 
wear “Nazi bucket helmets and black storm trooper uniforms.” Mr. La Pierre 
was referring to Federal Bureau of Investigation and Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms agents involved in law enforcement actions in Ruby 
Ridge, Idaho, and at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas; see also 
Dan K. Thomasson, NRA Call to Enforce Gun Laws Lip Service, DESERT NEWS, 
July 23, 2000, at AA-04 (describing the NRA’s anti-ATF campaign against 
Congress as efforts to paint ATF agents as “Nazis only interested in violating 
the constitutional rights of Americans”). 
87 See BRADY CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, THE ENFORCEMENT 
FABLE: HOW THE NRA PREVENTED ENFORCEMENT OF THE COUNTRY’S GUN 
LAWS (2002) (explaining how the NRA has maintained a strict policy of 
opposing any effort to strengthen gun safety laws since the passage of the 1968 
Gun Control Act, including passage of Gun Owners Protection Act, McClure-
Volkmer in 1986 and promotion of gun industry preemption laws today); see 
also Carl T. Bogus, Symposium on the Second Amendment: Fresh Looks: The 
History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: A Primer, 76 CHI.-
BHOWMIK MACRO 3-27.DOC 4/1/03 2:39 PM 
92 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
created the Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) in 
1972, it exempted firearms.88 All other consumer products, 
except tobacco, are regulated for safety.89 Thanks to the influence 
of the “friendless” gun industry, however, guns are not. When 
asked why the bill to include guns under the CPSC had failed in 
Congress, Senator Howard Metzenbaum said “[t]he NRA’s 
position is consistent. They’re opposed to any legislation that has 
the word ‘gun’ anywhere in it.”90 When asked what would 
happen if the NRA were to refrain from opposing the bill, 
                                                          
KENT L. REV. 3 (2000) (discussing the NRA’s “concerted effort to promote 
more writing supporting the individual right position” by “distributing large 
sums to friendly scholars”); Carl T. Bogus, Gun Litigation and Societal Values, 
32 CONN. L. REV. 1353 (2000) (explaining NRA’s opposition to any additional 
gun control laws because the mechanism to prevent gun crime is better 
enforcement of existing laws). 
88 See Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(E) (2002) 
(excepting any article from the definition of “consumer product, which would be 
subject to Consumer Product Safety Commission oversight, if such article is 
subject to the tax imposed by Internal Revenue Code § 4181, which imposes 
taxes on firearms, shells and cartridges”). Articles which are defined as 
‘consumer products’ are regulated by the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
which promulgates performance requirements, requirements that a consumer 
product be marked with or accompanied by clear and adequate warnings or 
instructions, or requirements respecting the form of warnings or instructions, 
and any requirements of such a standard shall be reasonably necessary to 
prevent or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury associated with such product. 
Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2056 (2002). 
89 See Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a) (exempting 
tobacco, firearms, shells and cartridges from the Safety Commission oversight 
but the Act states that the other exempted categories—motor vehicles, 
pesticides, aircraft, boats, food, drugs, and cosmetics—are regulated under other 
federal acts). See also Jon S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, A Public Health 
Approach to Regulating Firearms as Consumer Products, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 
1193 (2000) (advocating a consumer product-based regulatory scheme for 
firearms which would include the following: (1) standards for safe design; (2) 
closer regulation of firearm models that are particularly dangerous or attractive 
to criminals; (3) surveillance and recall authority; (4) improved manufacturer 
and government oversight of firearm dealers and distributors; (5) requirements 
for responsible advertising practices; and (6) no immunity from litigation for 
firearm manufacturers). 
90 ROBERT SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 81 (Chatham House 
Publishers 2d ed. 1998). 
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Metzenbaum replied, “[w]e would pass the bill overnight.”91 
This vacuum of gun safety standards has led to predictably 
tragic consequences. Without regulation, gun manufacturers lack 
any incentive to design safer firearms.92 Instead, manufacturers 
enjoy tremendous profits while producing products with a callous 
disregard for safety. Moreover, the illogical result of this specific 
exemption from regulatory oversight is that the CPSC has 
statutory oversight of trigger locks, holsters, and other products 
sold as accessories for firearms, but no oversight of the guns 
themselves.93 
In addition to supporting exemption of the gun industry from 
safety standards, the NRA has lobbied across the country for 
laws immunizing gun manufacturers from lawsuits brought by 
cities, and in some cases, consumers as well.94 In February 1999, 
                                                          
91 Id. 
92 See, e.g., Rachana Bhowmik et al., A Sense of Duty: Retiring the 
“Special Relationship” Rule and Holding Gun Manufacturers Liable for 
Negligently Distributing Guns, 4 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 41 (2000) 
(discussing the lack of incentives for gun manufacturers to design or distribute 
with safety in mind). See also Amy Edwards, Mail-Order Gun Kits and 
Fingerprint-Resistant Pistols: Why Washington Courts Should Impose a Duty on 
Gun Manufacturers to Market Firearms Responsibly, 75 WASH. L. REV. 941, 
948 (2000) (arguing that not holding gun manufacturers strictly liable for 
injuries caused by criminal use allows them to continue to market products that 
are used for criminal purposes); Lytton, supra note 14, at 1 (arguing that tort 
liability can complement legislative regulations, providing gun sellers and 
manufacturers with incentives to take responsible measures to protect the public 
at large). 
93 See Memorandum from Stephen Lemberg, Asst. General Counsel, U.S. 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, to Michael S. Solender, General 
Counsel, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, Commission Jurisdiction 
Over Separate Firearm Trigger Locks (Jul. 12, 2000) (on file with author); see 
also Press Release, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, CPSC, National 
Shooting Sports Foundation Announce Recall to Replace Project Homesafe Gun 
Locks (Feb. 7, 2001) (on file with author) (recalling 400,000 defective trigger 
locks distributed by gun industry trade association, the National Shooting Sports 
Foundation). 
94 See, e.g., National Rifle Association, 6 Fax Alert 18 (1999) (asking NRA 
members to call state legislatures in support of gun lawsuit preemption laws), 
available at http://www.nramemberscouncils.com/contracosta/FaxAlerts/ 
fa990514.shtml; James Brooke, Terror in Littleton: The Gun Debate, N.Y. 
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the Georgia State Legislature became the first to enact legislation 
prohibiting municipalities from bringing tort suits against any 
“firearms or ammunition manufacturer, trade association, or 
dealer,” subject to limited exceptions.95 Since then, over twenty 
other states have followed suit, passing legislation providing the 
gun industry with a blanket exemption from cities’ basic common 
law tort claims.96 The state of Colorado passed a law prohibiting 
                                                          
TIMES, April 23, 1999, at A1 (discussing stricter proposed gun legislation before 
the Colorado legislature in the wake of the Littleton high school shootings); Sam 
Howe Verhovek, Firearms Limits Gaining Support in Legislatures, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 31, 1999, at A1 (discussing attempts to limit liability of gun makers). 
95 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-184 (2002) (reserving the right to sue 
manufacturers to the state alone); see also Sturm, Roger & Co. v. City of 
Atlanta, 560 S.E.2d 525, 529 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that the state 
legislature, through the Georgia statute, intended for firearms regulation to take 
place on the state level). The state’s intent to preempt this area “can be inferred 
from the comprehensive nature of the statutes regulating firearms in Georgia,” 
among which is GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-184. 
96 ALA. CODE § 11-80-11 (2001) (reserving authority to bring and settle 
lawsuits involving firearms to the Attorney General, by and with the consent of 
the Governor); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.155 (2001) (conferring immunity with 
the exception of negligent design claims); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-714 (2001) 
(prohibiting any political subdivision from commencing a civil liability action 
against a firearm manufacturer in state court); ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-16-504 
(2001) (prohibiting any local unit of government from commencing an action 
against a firearms manufacturer or dealer and reserving that right to recover to 
the State of Arkansas); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-504.5 (2001) (stating “a 
person or other private or public entity may not bring an action other than a 
product liability action”); FLA. STAT. ch. 790.331 (2002) (declaring “the 
manufacture, distribution, or sale of firearms and ammunition . . . lawful activity 
and [ ] not unreasonably dangerous, and . . . that the unlawful use of firearms 
and ammunition, rather than their lawful manufacture, distribution, or sale, is the 
proximate cause of injuries arising from their unlawful use”); IDAHO CODE § 5-
247 (2002) (requiring state legislature to approve suits brought by a 
governmental unit on behalf of any other governmental unit); IND. CODE ANN. § 
34-12-3-3 (Michie 2002) (prohibiting nuisance suits by persons against firearms 
or ammunition makers, trade associations or sellers); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
65.045 (Michie 2001) (reserving to the Commonwealth the right to bring suit 
and recover against a firearms dealer on behalf of the state); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 40:1799 (West 2002) (reserving to the state the right to recover against a 
firearms dealer); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.435(9) (2002) (reserving to the state 
the right to bring suit against a producer of firearms or ammunition); MONT. 
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suits by individuals against those responsible for negligently sold 
guns.97 For example, the law prevents victims of the Columbine 
school shooting from suing gun distributors, where prohibited 
purchasers used negligently sold guns to massacre their teachers 
and classmates.98 As commentators have noted, “[t]his legislative 
strategy mirrors the NRA’s largely successful efforts in the 1980s 
                                                          
CODE ANN. § 7-1-115 (2001) (reserving exclusively to the state the right to 
bring suit against firearms manufacturers and specifically prohibiting actions in 
that area by a local governmental unit); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.107 (Michie 
2001) (reserving to the state the right to bring suit against firearms distributors 
or manufacturers); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-54 (2002) (limiting the liability of 
firearm manufacturers, sellers, and distributors in wrongful death actions 
because of the use of firearms by another); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.401 
(Anderson 2002) (creating immunity for members of the firearms industry “for 
harm allegedly sustained by any person as a result of the operation or discharge 
of a firearm”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1289.24a (2002) (reserving the authority to 
bring suit against a firearms manufacturer or dealer on behalf of a governmental 
unit to the state); 18 PA. CONST. STAT. § 6120 (2002) (prohibiting any 
municipality or country from bringing suit against a firearms manufacturer for 
the marketing or sale of the firearm or ammunition); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-
1314 (2001) (reserving the authority to bring suit on behalf of the state 
exclusively to the state); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 128.001 (Vernon 
2002) (requiring legislative approval for suits brought against firearm 
manufacturers or dealers); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-64 (2002) (prohibiting all 
suits against gun manufacturers other than for breach of warranty or contract); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-915.1 (Michie 2002) (reserving to the Commonwealth 
the right to bring suit against members of the firearms industry); see also MO. 
REV. STAT. § 67.138 (2001) (creating liability for all costs associated with a 
frivolous lawsuit brought by a political subdivision against a firearm or 
ammunition manufacturer); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159-C:10(v), repealed 
1994 (granting civil and criminal immunity to any licensed firearm importer, 
manufacturer, or dealer who relies upon a background check in making a sale of 
a firearm). 
97 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-504.5 (2002) (establishing that a gun 
seller cannot be held liable for a third party’s injury, damage, or death, even if 
the injury is found to be foreseeable, unless the damages were proximately 
caused by a gun seller in violation of a state or federal statute or regulation). 
98 See id. See also Charles Brennan, Columbine Lifts New Gun Rules to 
Victory in Colorado, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 9, 2000, at 6A (discussing 
the Columbine shooting, in particular, the way in which shooters obtained guns 
sold at a gun show by a straw purchaser who was not subject to a background 
check). 
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and 90s to convince state legislatures to enact preemption laws 
that forbid localities from enacting their own gun control laws. 
Today more than forty states have some form of firearm 
preemption law.”99 This unprecedented blanket exemption for a 
particular industry underscores the strength of the gun industry 
and its ability to encroach upon even the most basic consumer 
rights. This exemption also demonstrates the need for some 
behavior-enforcing mechanism to encourage the gun industry to 
act responsibly.100 
Recently, House Representative Bob Barr, who since lost his 
bid for reelection101 but remains an NRA board member,102 
sponsored legislation that would further exempt the gun industry 
                                                          
99 John S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, New Courtroom Strategies 
Regarding Firearms: Tort Litigation Against Firearm Manufacturers and 
Constitutional Challenges to Gun Laws, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1713, 1753 (1999). 
Preemption laws forbid most cities from enacting their own gun control laws as 
an alternative to lawsuits. The courts have still not answered the question of 
whether state legislatures have the authority to forbid localities from bringing 
lawsuits against firearm manufacturers. Id. 
100 See Brent W. Landau, State Bans on City Gun Lawsuits, 37 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 623, 638 (2000). “State laws that prevent cities from suing the gun 
industry are . . . undesirable because they deny local governments the ability to 
have their day in court on the issue of who should bear the financial burden of 
gun violence.” Id. See also Kairys, supra note 15, at 6. Kairys stated:  
 [t]he damages incurred by cities that directly result from the 
manufacturers’ conduct are wide-ranging and . . . can include 
medical costs and the range of expenses incurred by police, 
emergency personnel, public health, human services, courts, prisons, 
sheriff, fire, and other services. A city’s potential damages can begin 
with a 911 call, cleaning blood from the street, and emergency 
medical care, and continue through support of an orphaned child. 
Id. 
101 Dahleen Glanton, Georgia’s Barr Loses Seat; McKinney Falls in 
Democratic Race, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 21, 2002, at 9 (discussing Bob Barr’s loss in 
the Republican primary to another conservative regarded as more low-key than 
the nationally renowned Barr). 
102 Bob Barr, a former Assistant Majority Whip in the House, is a “life 
member” of the National Rifle Association and serves on its board of directors. 
See Bob Barr Leadership Fund, About Bob Barr, http://www.bobbarr.org (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2002). 
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from liability.103 The bill, first proposed in the 106th Congress, is 
called the “Firearms Heritage Protection Act.”104 The bill’s 
express purpose is to “prohibit civil liability actions from being 
brought or continued against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, 
or importers of firearms or ammunition for damages resulting 
from the misuse of their products by others.”105 The broadly 
worded House bill would effectively bar gun owners and any 
others from pursuing cases against the gun industry, even if the 
industry’s negligence is a clear cause of the harm suffered. 
Senators Zell Miller and Larry Craig, also an NRA Board 
Member, sponsored similar legislation in the Senate.106 
                                                          
103 Firearms Heritage Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1032, 106th Cong. 
(1999). The purpose of the bill is “[t]o prohibit civil liability actions from being 
brought or continued against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, or importers of 
firearms or ammunition for damages resulting from the misuse of their products 
by others.” See Vito Magglio, Rep. Barr Aims to Ban Lawsuits Against Gun 
Manufacturers, CNN (March 9, 1999), available at http://www.cnn.com/ 
ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/03/09/guns.barr. Barr charged that lawsuits 
brought by major cities against gun manufacturers to collect the costs for crimes 
committed with guns are in violation of a citizen’s Second Amendment right to 
bear arms and are an unfair burden on a legitimate industry. Id. Barr states that 
“[i]f these lawsuits are allowed to proceed, then it really will be ‘Katie bar the 
door,’ because there will be no industry in America that will be safe from these 
abusive and predatory laws.” Id. See also, Protection of Lawful Commerce in 
Arms Act of 2001, H.R. 2037, 107th Cong. (2001) (proposing similar legislation 
sponsored by Rep. Cliff Stearns “[t]o amend the Act establishing the 
Department of Commerce to protect manufacturers and sellers in the firearms 
and ammunition industry from restrictions on interstate or foreign commerce.”). 
104 H.R. 1032, 106th Cong. (1999). 
105 Id. 
106 See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act of 2002, S. 2268, 
107th Cong. (2002) (“To amend the Act establishing the Department of 
Commerce to protect manufacturers and sellers in the firearms and ammunition 
industry from restrictions on interstate or foreign commerce.”). See also Clinton 
Takes Gun Control Message to School Children, CNN (Apr. 17, 2000) (stating 
that Larry Craig is a board member of the National Rifle Association who 
advocates that education, not legislation is the key to stopping gun violence), at 
http://www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/04/17/clinton.guns; John 
DeVries, Weapons in the Cockpit, THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE, June 23, 2002 
(characterizing Democrat Zell Miller of Georgia as a member of the NRA Board 
of Directors who often aligns himself with Senate Republicans), at 
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Both the House and Senate bills would prevent cases similar 
to Kitchen v. K-Mart, where the plaintiff sued the retail chain 
under a theory of negligent entrustment for selling a gun to a 
patently drunk man who then immediately used the gun to shoot 
plaintiff, rendering her paraplegic.107 The Florida Supreme Court 
found that gun sellers could be held liable under negligence 
theories for sales that are entirely legal.108 The court noted that it 
“cannot close [its] eyes to this obvious danger or fail to impose 
some responsibility on those who control access to dangerous 
firearms.”109 The broad protections Bob Barr and other opponents 
                                                          
http://balderdashe.com/usapol/archives/vol2/V2-24.html. 
107 697 So. 2d 1200, 1204 (Fla. 1997). Kitchen was shot by her ex-
boyfriend, Thomas Knapp, who testified that he had consumed a fifth of 
whiskey and a case of beer that morning and until he left a local bar around 8:30 
p.m. Id. Knapp drove from the bar to a local K-Mart store where he purchased a 
rifle and a box of bullets. Id. He returned to the bar and, after observing Kitchen 
leave in an automobile with friends, followed in his truck. Id. He subsequently 
rammed their car, forcing it off the road, and shot Kitchen at the base of her 
neck. See also Angel v. F. Avanzini Lumber Co., 363 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 2d Dist. 
Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a dealer in firearms could have foreseen the 
probability of someone being injured after selling a firearm to an erratic 
purchaser); Howard Bros. of Phoenix City, Inc. v. Penley, 492 So. 2d 965 (Miss. 
1986) (finding a gun retailer liable for negligently entrusting a pistol to a 
purchaser who was mentally deranged and under the influence of drugs and 
alcohol and who subsequently held another customer hostage). 
108 Kitchen, 697 So. 2d at 1204. Under common law “zone of risk” 
analysis, respondent’s selling the gun to an intoxicated purchaser created a 
foreseeable risk that a third party might be injured with the gun. Id. Pursuant to 
the common-law doctrine of negligent entrustment, as the risk grew, so did 
respondent’s duty. Id. The court noted that a number of Florida appellate courts 
had already recognized liability in similar factual scenarios. Id. 
109 Id. at 1207. See also Bernethy v. Walt Failor’s Inc., 653 P.2d 280 
(Wash. 1982) (gun dealer liable for legal sale to man who had been on a two day 
drinking binge and then killed his wife); K-Mart Enters. of Fla. v. Keller, 439 
So. 2d 283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) reh’g denied, 450 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1984) 
(upholding judgment against gun dealer for negligent sale of gun to brother of 
man who later shot police officer); Decker v. Gibson Products Company of 
Albany, Inc., 679 F.2d 212 (11th Cir. 1982) (reversing a district court’s grant of 
summary judgment where the sale of a firearm to a former felon who used the 
gun to kill his ex-wife was a breach of the retailer’s duty); Cullum & Boren-
McCain Mall, Inc. v. Peacock, 592 S.W.2d 442 (Ark. 1980) (finding sufficient 
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to such common sense liability seek represents unparalleled 
preferential treatment for an industry that “controls access to 
dangerous firearms.”110 Interestingly, even staunch gun safety 
regulation opponent Robert Levy opposes such legislation, 
arguing that such state common law causes of action are “none of 
the (federal government’s) business.”111 
The gun industry and the NRA have also found a strong 
champion in current Attorney General John Ashcroft.112 Ashcroft 
has long been a friend of the NRA, supporting NRA-supported 
initiatives to weaken gun ownership laws in his home state of 
Missouri and receiving the NRA’s highest grades when he served 
as a United States Senator.113 Ashcroft’s stance is in strong 
contrast to the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ’s”) position under 
the Clinton Administration, and directly contradicts the United 
States’ longstanding position on the Second Amendment.114 
                                                          
evidence of breach of common law duty where gun dealer violated no federal 
statute by selling a gun to a man who acted strangely and asked for a gun “that 
would make a big hole,” loaded the gun in his car and later shot a man for no 
reason); Angell v. F. Avanzini Lumber Co., 363 So. 2d 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1978) (reversing dismissal where gun dealer sold rifle to woman who was acting 
strangely and then killed a man); Pavlides v. Niles Gun Show, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 
404 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (finding negligent gun show owner liable for the 
subsequent criminal shooting of four teenagers who, due to lax security at gun 
show, stole several handguns form a gun show and shot bystander while driving 
stolen car; also held that reasonable minds could find that Pavlides’s shooting 
was a foreseeable consequence of the gun show’s negligent security). 
110 See Kitchen, 697 So. 2d at 1207. 
111 See Robert A. Levy, None of Their Business, NAT’L REV., May 22, 2002 
(arguing that legislation which shields gun makers and sellers from liability 
lawsuits is an abuse of Congress’s commerce power, and that such legislation is 
more appropriately left to the individual states), available at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-levy052202.asp. 
112 See, e.g., National Rifle Association, 6 Fax Alert 18 (1999) (asking 
NRA members to call and voice support for nomination of Ashcroft to serve as 
United States Attorney General), available at http://www.nramemberscouncils. 
com/contracosta/FaxAlerts/fa990514.shtml. 
113 See Press Release, Handgun Control, NRA Favorite Son John Ashcroft 
Defeated in Reelection Campaign for U.S. Senate in Missouri (Nov. 8, 2000), 
available at http://www.gunlawsuits.org/features/press/release.asp?Record=36. 
114 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, GUN VIOLENCE REDUCTION: 
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Despite promises to the Senate Judiciary Committee that he 
would uphold gun control laws, Ashcroft has continually sought 
to use his position to weaken federal firearm regulation.115 In 
                                                          
NATIONAL INTEGRATED FIREARMS VIOLENCE REDUCTION STRATEGY (1999) 
[hereinafter GUN VIOLENCE REDUCTION], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
archive/opd/ExecSum.htm. The DOJ’s report states: 
 The firearms industry must do much more to help solve our country’s 
firearms violence problem. Each gun manufacturer and distributor 
must do a better job of policing its own distribution chain to reduce 
the illegal supply of guns and keep them from falling into the hands 
of criminals, unauthorized juveniles, and other prohibited persons. 
And the industry must do much more to ensure that firearms are 
transferred only to persons who have the knowledge and experience 
to handle them safely. The firearms industry also must do everything 
it can to design its products to be as safe as reasonably possible. We 
are actively encouraging manufacturers to voluntarily improve their 
distribution controls, incorporate existing safety devices on their 
firearms, and devote significant resources to developing new safety 
devices and technologies to prevent accidental shootings.  
Id. 
See also the following cases in which United States supported application of the 
Miller decision. U.S. v. Lewis, 236 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 2001) (refusing to apply 
Emerson decision’s finding that Second Amendment protects individual right to 
bear arms); U.S. v. Baer, 235 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 2000) (refusing to apply 
Emerson decision’s finding that Second Amendment protects rights of 
individuals to keep arms); U.S. v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(upholding finding that Second Amendment does not protect an individual’s 
right to keep and bear arms). 
115 See, e.g., An Ominous Reversal on Gun Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 
2002 at A18. The editorial discusses the Bush administration’s radical shift in 
policy towards the rights of Americans to own guns. By using a standard that 
equates gun ownership with free speech rights, Mr. Ashcroft and the Bush 
administration has made it extremely difficult for the government to regulate 
firearms in the manner it has for the last six decades. See also 147 CONG. REC. § 
839 (2001) Senator Leahy stated: 
 [c]ontrary to the majority of the American public, Senator Ashcroft 
vigorously opposes stricter gun control laws. He addressed this issue 
during the hearing, where he seemed to change his long held beliefs 
and emphasized his commitment to enforce the gun laws and defend 
their constitutionality. He testified that “there are constitutional 
inhibitions on the rights of citizens to bear certain kinds of arms.” 
Saying he supported some controls, Senator Ashcroft referred to his 
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2001, Ashcroft proposed a policy of destroying Brady Act gun 
purchase records after merely 24 hours.116 This was despite a 
federal appeals court ruling that upheld maintaining those records 
for six months to audit the background check system.117 This 
same court supported the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
recommendation that the record retention period be increased to 
one year.118 Furthermore, a recently released Government 
Accounting Office (“GAO”) report released in July of 2002 
indicated that the Ashcroft changes would “adversely affect some 
aspects of current [gun check] operations, which would have 
public safety implications.”119 
                                                          
attempt to amend the juvenile justice bill to make semiautomatic 
assault weapons illegal for children. However, he neglected to 
mention that his proposed amendment was actually a weaker version 
of one proposed by Senator Feinstein. At the hearing, Senator 
Ashcroft also testified that the assault weapons ban, the Brady law, 
licensing and registration of guns, and mandatory child safety locks 
are all constitutional. Although Senator Ashcroft’s testimony was 
intended to ease our concerns about his willingness to enforce gun 
control laws, it is difficult to reconcile what he said last week with his 
rhetoric and his record. 
Id. 
116 Paul M. Krawzak, Report Shows Problems With Gun Check Plan, 
COPLEY NEWS SERVICE, July 25, 2002 (describing Government Accounting 
Office Report with Ashcroft’s refusal to release gun check records despite FBI’s 
request to use them in its efforts against terrorism). 
117 See NRA v. Reno, 216 F.3d 122 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that nothing 
in either 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(t)(2) or Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act 
unambiguously prohibited temporary retention of the hand gun check records for 
allowed transactions). The court found that the appellee’s interpretation that the 
audit log regulation represented a permissible construction of the requirement to 
establish a system for preventing disqualified persons from purchasing firearms 
was reasonable. Id. 
118 Id. at 124. 
119 Potential Effects of Next-Day Destruction of NICS Background Check 
Records, Government Accounting Office Report, GAO-02-653 (July 2002) 
(explaining how the FBI’s National Instant Criminal Background Check System 
(“NICS”) would be affected if records of sales of firearms by licensed dealers 
were destroyed within 24 hours of the transaction). The GAO study found that 
while routine system audits may not be adversely affected by the proposed 
requirement of next-day destruction of records, other uses of NICS records 
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In the midst of the United States continued war against 
terrorism, and despite the FBI’s specific request for review of 
Brady Act gun purchase records, Ashcroft unilaterally decided 
that these documents cannot be used to determine whether 
persons detained as suspected terrorists had recently purchased a 
gun.120 Ashcroft claimed that federal law did not permit the use 
of Brady Background check records as investigative tools.121 
Reports show, however, that his contention directly contradicted 
an opinion released by the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel stating 
that the office saw “nothing in the National Instant Check System 
regulations that prohibits the FBI from deriving additional 
benefits from checking audit log records as long as one of the 
genuine purposes” is auditing the use of the system.122 
In addition to weakening gun background checks, Ashcroft 
has also reversed longstanding DOJ policy on the Second 
Amendment, which was in keeping with the United States 
Supreme Court’s finding that the Second Amendment does not 
protect an individual’s right to keep and bear arms.123 In 
footnotes to the United States’ briefs in two gun possession cases 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, including Emerson 
v. U.S., the DOJ notes that “the Second Amendment ‘more 
broadly’ protects the rights of individuals to bear arms, and does 
not relate only to the operation of militias.”124 
                                                          
would be affected with consequences for safety and NICS operations. Id. 
120 John Meyer, Response to Terror Security Ashcroft Defends U.S. Anti-
Terrorism Tactics, Saying That ‘We Are at War’ Law: Attorney General tells 
lawmakers he won’t support FBI background checks on gun buyers to aid attack 
inquiry, L.A. TIMES, Dec.7, 2001, at A4 (reporting that Ashcroft did not support 
a change in the law that would allow the FBI to find out whether an illegal 
immigrant or suspected terrorist had purchased a gun). 
121 Id. 
122 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF NEXT-DAY 
DESTRUCTION 6 (July 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d02653.pdf. See also Fox Butterfield, Traces of Terror: the Gun Laws, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 24, 2002, at A14 (discussing DOJ memo on policy of using 
background checks to assist law enforcement);  
123 See supra note 60 (discussing U.S. Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. 
Miller, finding Second Amendment protects the states’ right to arm the militia). 
124 See Brief for Government, Emerson v. U.S., 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 
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This change in the DOJ’s position has had predictable results. 
It has motivated challenges to even the most entrenched area of 
gun regulation: the criminalization of certain uses and types of 
possession. Criminal defendants now seek dismissal of gun 
charges, arguing that under the DOJ’s interpretation, the Second 
Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess a firearm.125 
Indeed, Taliban member John Walker Lindh relied upon the 
Ashcroft DOJ’s interpretation of the Second Amendment as part 
of his defense.126 The change in policy has placed United States 
Attorneys in the unfortunate position of trying to advocate a 
position unsupported by precedent, while simultaneously 
attempting to enforce federal firearm legislation. For example, 
criminal defendants in the District of Columbia attempted to rely 
upon the DOJ’s interpretation of the Second Amendment as a 
defense to convictions under criminal possession laws.127 There, 
                                                          
2001) (No. 01-8780). Brief for Government, Haney v. U.S., 264 F.3d 1151 (10th 
Cir. 2001) (No.01-8272). In a strange twist of circumstances, in the opposition 
for a petition for rehearing of Emerson, Ashcroft’s DOJ refused to challenge an 
appellate argument that the Second Amendment provides an individual with the 
right to weapons. Id. 
125 See Arthur Santana & Neely Tucker, Cases Take Aim at District’s Gun 
Law; Attorney Uses Bush Adminstration’s Second Amendment Stand in Attack 
on Ban, WASH. POST, June 3, 2002, at A20 (reporting that defense attorneys had 
filed about 30 motions in D.C. Superior Court asking judges to dismiss gun-
carrying charges against their clients based on the Department of Justice and the 
Bush administration’s assertion that the Second Amendment gives them the 
right to bear arms). 
126 See Government Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Count Ten of 
Indictment, U.S. v. Lindh, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20863, n.12 (E.D. Va. 2002) 
(Crim. No. 02-37A) (responding to Lindh’s Second Amendment defense, the 
government asserted that the case cited by defendant, Wilborg v. U.S., 163 U.S. 
632 (1896), is wholly inapposite and confined to the criminal status extent, and 
“‘whatever the defendant’s Second Amendment rights may be, they do not 
extend to carrying weapons in support of a terrorist organization bent on the 
violent destruction of the United States.”). See Stuart M. Powell, Lindh’s Right 
to Bear Arms Stops Short of Aiding Terror, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, June 6, 
2002, at A11 (arguing that charging Lindh with a firearms violation would be an 
abridgement of his Second Amendment rights as an individual, Lindh pointed to 
a DOJ assertion of the same argument in a case then pending before the 
Supreme Court). 
127 See Press Release, Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney for the District 
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United States Attorneys relied upon case law upholding the 
District’s laws prohibiting possession of unregistered handguns, 
but were forced to note that the opinion “contains reasoning that 
is inconsistent with the position of the United States as to the 
scope of the Second Amendment.”128 Ashcroft’s weakening of the 
nation’s gun laws, and reversal of the DOJ’s long-standing 
position on the Second Amendment underscores the lengths to 
which friends of the gun industry will go to protect it from 
liability. 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE GUN INDUSTRY 
Although guns in this country are exempt from most 
consumer product safety standards, they are subject to a body of 
laws regarding their sale.129 These laws are intended to keep 
“lethal weapons out of the hands of criminals, drug addicts, 
mentally disordered persons, juveniles, and other persons whose 
possession of them is too high a price to pay in danger for us 
all.”130 Unfortunately, this policy is regularly undermined by a 
                                                          
of Columbia, U.S. Department of Justice, District Man Convicted of First-
Degree Murder While Armed for Shooting Friend in Struggle Over a Gun in 
S.W. Parking Lot (June 10, 2002) (discussing a motion to dismiss the charge of 
carrying a pistol without a license, claiming that the District of Columbia’s 
statute violated the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ usao/dc/press/02176.html. 
128 Evan P. Schultz, Bullets for Ballots in D.C., LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 5, 
2002, at 58, citing Dennis Henigan, Ashcroft’s Bad Aim, LEGAL TIMES, July 29, 
2002, at 34 (discussing the difficult position that federal prosecutors have been 
put in by Ashcroft’s conflicted position with long standing and established law 
on the scope of the Second Amendment). 
129 See supra Part II for discussion of exemption. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 
(2002) (prohibiting purchase of firearms by certain classes of people and 
providing regulations regarding sale of firearms by licensed firearm dealers). 
See also Huddleston v. U.S., 415 U.S. 814, 825 (1974) (quoting Sen. Tydings in 
114 CONG. REC. 13219 (1968) and recognizing that federal gun laws are 
intended to keep “these lethal weapons out of the hands of criminals, drug 
addicts, mentally disordered persons, juveniles, and other persons whose 
possession of them is too high a price in danger for all of us to allow.”). 
130 Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 825 (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 13219 (1968) for 
a statement by Sen. Tydings asserting that Sec. 922 was “enacted as a means of 
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vast, thriving underground market which regularly provides guns 
to those who are prohibited from buying them in retail markets. 
The underground market is largely supplied by guns diverted 
from licensed dealers.131 That is, guns purchased from licensed 
retailers with the intent to promptly resell or transfer them to 
prohibited purchasers.132 
Gun makers are fully aware that the retailers and distributors 
they supply often act as willing conduits that enable the 
continuing, thriving underground market in guns.133 Many of 
these trafficked guns, however, have design defects which, if 
remedied, would drastically reduce the likelihood that guns 
would be trafficked in the underground market.134 
Given that the primary sources for illegally trafficked guns 
have been well-known for decades, gun manufacturers are on 
notice that their design and distribution choices have a definite 
effect on the proliferation of the underground market.135 
Furthermore, gun manufacturers are repeatedly notified that their 
                                                          
providing adequate and truthful information about firearms transactions”). See 
also Firearms Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2002) (establishing that it is “unlawful for 
any person, except a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed 
dealer, to engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in 
firearms [or ammunition] or in the course of such business to ship, transport, or 
receive any firearm in interstate or foreign commerce”). 
131 See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, YOUTH CRIME 
GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE, PERFORMANCE REPORT 6 (1999) [hereinafter 
PERFORMANCE REPORT] (reporting that half of the Bureau’s investigations 
involved guns trafficked by straw purchasers, 14 percent from other unregulated 
sellers, 10 percent from gun shows and other similar ventures and 6 percent 
from Federal Firearm License (“FFL”) holders), available at 
http://www.atf.treas.gov/firearms/ycgii/preport.pdf.  
132 Id. at 6. 
133 See Affidavit of Robert I. Hass, Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 95-CV-0049 
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) at 20-21 (describing familiarity with the distribution and 
marketing practices of the principal U.S. firearms manufacturers and stating that 
none of them investigate, screen or supervise the wholesale distributors and 
retail outlets that sell their products to insure responsible distribution) 
[hereinafter Hass Affidavit]. 
134 See infra Part III.B (discussing design changes that can reduce 
usefulness of trafficked or illegally acquired guns). 
135 See infra Part III.C (discussing tracing system). 
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guns are sold via the underground crime gun market.136 Yet they 
refuse to do anything to stem the tide of their products into the 
underground market. The combination of the gun industry’s 
negligence in manufacturing and designing weapons, coupled 
with willful blindness towards the distribution of guns into the 
underground market perpetuates the dangers of illegally held 
guns. 
A. Proliferation of the Underground Gun Market: How the 
Use of “Multiple Sales” and “Straw Purchasers” Fuel 
a Dangerous Marketplace 
Guns that flow into the underground market are often bought 
from retail firearms dealers in suspect transactions, such as 
multiple sales and straw purchasers.137 According to the Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”), “virtually all new 
firearms used in crime first pass through the legitimate 
distribution system of federally licensed firearm dealers 
(“FFLs”).”138\ 
Studies indicate that “multiple sales” and sales of more than 
one gun in a transaction, are the most common sources of crime 
guns.139 The term “multiple sales” refers to any transaction 
                                                          
136 See id. 
137 See Julius Wachtel, Sources of Crime Guns in Los Angeles, California, 
21 POLICING: AN INT’L J. OF POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 220, 221 (1998) 
(outlining firearms markets). See, e.g., Mark Polston, Should Manufacturers, 
Distributors, and Dealers Be Held Accountable for the Harm Caused by Guns?: 
Civil Liability for High Risk Gun Sales: An Approach to Combat Gun 
Trafficking, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 821 (1995) (discussing “straw purchases” 
as a ready source of criminal guns). 
138 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A PROGRESS REPORT: GUN DEALER 
LICENSING & ILLEGAL GUN TRAFFICKING (Jan. 1997) (discussing steps taken to 
reduce illegal availability of firearms to criminals and juveniles, such as more 
effective screening of firearms purchasers, strengthening the gun dealer 
licensing system and compliance with applicable laws and regulations), 
available at http://web.archive.org/web/19980129032256/http://www.ustreas. 
gov/enforcement/cover.html. 
139 See Wachtel, supra note 137, at 221. When a licensed gun dealer sells 
two or more handguns to an unlicensed person within a five-day period, dealers 
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involving more than one handgun to a single purchaser or several 
sales of guns to an individual purchaser over a five-day period.140 
In recognition of the significant role multiple sales play in 
supplying the underground market, federal law requires that any 
“multiple sale” be accompanied by a “multiple sales form” which 
is sent to the ATF to notify the law enforcement agency of the 
transaction.141 The very fact that an FFL engages in multiple 
sales is an indicator that the dealer is likely selling to gun 
traffickers.142 
Curbing such sales can have a significant effect on gun 
trafficking to criminals. For example, the Commonwealth of 
Virginia was traditionally a primary source state for crime 
guns.143 In 1993, however, Virginia banned multiple handgun 
sales,144 and in doing so, successfully eliminated a major source 
                                                          
are required to fill out and forward to the ATF a form listing the guns sold. See 
27 C.F.R. §178.126a. There is no federal limit on the number of firearms that 
can be purchased in a single sale, and the only states that have such limits are 
Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, and California. See Douglas S. Weil & 
Rebecca Knox, Effects of Limiting Handgun Purchases on Interstate Transfer of 
Firearms, 275 JAMA 1759 (June 12, 1996). 
140 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, COMMERCE IN FIREARMS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 25 (Feb. 2000) [hereinafter COMMERCE IN FIREARMS IN THE 
UNITED STATES] (reporting The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms’ 
(ATF) activities relating to the regulation of firearms during the calendar year 
1999), available at http://www.atf.treas.gov/pub/fire-explo_pub/020400report. 
pdf. 
141 See 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(3)(A) (2003). 
142 See COMMERCE IN FIREARMS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 140, at 
22 (explaining that multiple sales or purchases are a significant trafficking 
indicator because crime guns recovered with obliterated serial numbers are 
frequently purchased in multiple sales). 
143 See Weil & Knox, supra note 139, at 1759 (describing Virginia as a 
“principal supplier of guns to the illegal market in the northeaster United States); 
see also Laura Parker, ‘It was Easy,’ Confessions of a Gun Trafficker, U.S.A 
TODAY, Oct. 28, 1999, at A1 (discussing with a gun trafficker who was arrested 
after a gun he sold was used in a crime and traced back to him the ease of 
making multiple purchases and obtaining guns legally and redistributing them 
illegally without any one questioning the frequency and amounts of the 
purchases). 
144 See Weil & Knox, supra note 139, at 1759 (discussing a Virginia law 
limiting handgun purchases by an individual to one gun in a 30-day period). 
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of crime guns, as evidenced by the subsequent marked 
nationwide decrease in crime guns traced to Virginia.145 
Accordingly, legislative prohibitions of multiple sales can prevent 
sales to the underground gun market. 
Sales by licensed dealers to “straw purchasers” are another 
significant source of guns for the underground market.146 “Straw 
purchasers” are non-prohibited purchasers who fill out the 
paperwork and complete a firearm sales transaction, then hand 
the weapon over to a prohibited purchaser, such as a felon or 
minor.147 Data from tracing projects in 27 cities nationwide led 
the Chief of the ATF’s Crime Gun Analysis Bureau to conclude 
that: 
The [most important] single source of firearms is still 
illegal traffickers who are acquiring firearms from retail 
outlets. It still appears that acquisition of firearms by false 
declarations and straw purchasers are still the method 
preferred by traffickers, both small and large.148 
Recent undercover investigations in Chicago, Gary, Indiana and 
Wayne County, Michigan, confirmed that many dealers blatantly 
engage in straw purchases – one gun dealer was caught on 
                                                          
145 Of all nationwide crime guns traced to stores in the Southeastern United 
States, the percentage of those guns originating from Virginia plummeted from 
27 percent after the ban—even though gun trafficking from the Southeastern 
United States actually increased during that time. For crime guns in New York, 
the number of crime guns traced to Virginia dropped from 38.2 percent before 
the Virginia one handgun a month law to 15.3 after—a precipitous drop of more 
than 66 percent. See Weil and Knox, supra note 139, at 1760; see also Parker, 
supra note 143, at A1. 
146 See, e.g., Polston, supra note 137. See also infra Part III.A. 
147 See 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(a)(6) (2003) (prohibiting false statements when 
purchasing firearms); see also Anthony A. Braga & David M. Kennedy, Gun 
Control in America: Gunshows and Illegal Diversions of Firearms, 6 GEO. 
PUBLIC POL’Y REV. 7, 11 (2000) (discussing high percentage of crime guns that 
were straw purchased and defining term “straw purchase”); see also 
PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 131, and accompanying text (describing 
prohibited purchasers). 
148 Joseph J. Vince, Jr., Memo from the Chief, CGAB SHOTS 2, Oct. 1998; 
see also PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 131, at 6 (stating that half of 
trafficked guns were straw purchases). 
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videotape selling to a straw purchaser while declaring the 
transaction to be “highly illegal.”149 Such sales are a significant 
problem. 
In a congressional hearing on criminal gun sales, former gun 
trafficker Edward Daily explained the problem to the House 
Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice in great detail.150 
Daily described how he traveled to gun shows throughout 
Virginia and used straw purchasers to obtain multiple firearms, 
“I would basically point out the types of handguns that these 
straw purchasers would buy right in front of the gun dealers, and 
most of them didn’t even pay any attention to me. . . . 
[B]asically, a lot of them would hand the guns to me after I 
purchased them, and I would walk out with the guns myself and 
put them in my car.”151 Daily was able to purchase a total of 150 
handguns, of which 146 were obtained by straw purchasers.152 He 
acknowledged that dealers usually recognized straw purchasers 
when they saw them but continued to sell the weapons to such 
people anyway.153 These guns were not only straw purchased but 
many were part of multiple sales. Daily noted that “[e]ach 
individual would buy anywhere from 6 to maybe 8, and as a 
                                                          
149 See Barry Meier, Cities Turn to U.S. Gun Tracing Data for Legal 
Assault on Industry, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1999, at A12. Both Chicago and 
Wayne County carried out undercover operations involving law enforcement 
officers posing as juveniles and criminals who were barred from legally buying 
guns, blatantly attempting to engage in straw purchases. The dealers 
overwhelmingly cooperated with the undercover officers’ attempts to obtain 
firearms through straw purchases. Id. 
150 Federal Firearms Licensing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime 
and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong. 1st, 
sess. 8-14 (1993) (statement of witness Edward Daily, convicted gun trafficker) 
(detailing the ease with which illegal straw purchases were made from gun 
dealers in Virginia and North Carolina)[hereinafter Federal Firearms Licensing 
Hearing]. 
151 Id. at 9. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 8-9 According to Daily, the vendors who sold him guns 
recognized him as a repeat purchaser at these shows and understood that he was 
the actual purchaser in a sham transaction. 
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group, 12 to 20 a weekend.”154 Ultimately, the guns “were 
transported to New York City where they were traded for 
narcotics or sold individually.”155 
Daily’s dramatic testimony was echoed by Steve Higgins, 
then-Director of the ATF. Higgins stated that “the method by 
which criminals acquire firearms that is of most concern to us is 
the scenario where traffickers conspire with licensed dealers to 
divert firearms to criminal use.”156 Accordingly, the important 
role licensed dealers play in the underground market has been 
recognized by law enforcement for years. 
Additionally, studies suggest that a small number of licensed 
gun dealers are the source for a disproportionately large 
percentage of traced crime guns.157 For example, in 1998, one 
percent of all licensed gun dealers were the source for 45 percent 
of the successfully-traced crime guns.158 As ATF research 
indicates, although corrupt FFLs account for a small proportion 
of trafficking investigations they are responsible for the largest 
portion of illegally diverted firearms per investigation.159 This is 
                                                          
154 Id. at 10 (explaining the purchasing patterns of individual straw 
purchasers). 
155 Id. at 9. 
156 See Federal Firearms Licensing Hearing, supra note 150, at 19 
(statement of witness Steve Higgins). 
157 See Glenn L. Pierce et al., THE IDENTIFICATION OF PATTERNS IN 
FIREARMS TRAFFICKING: IMPLICATIONS FOR FOCUSED ENFORCEMENT 
STRATEGIES, A REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, 
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS (BATF) (1996); REPORT OF 
SENATOR CHARLES SCHUMER, A FEW BAD APPLES: SMALL NUMBER OF GUN 
DEALERS THE SOURCE OF THOUSANDS OF CRIMES (June 1999) (analyzing raw 
data collected by the BATF regarding the small number of dealers responsible 
for selling the majority of crime guns). 
158 See DEP’T OF TREAS. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, & FIREARMS, 
FOLLOWING THE GUN: ENFORCING FEDERAL LAWS AGAINST FIREARMS 
TRAFFICKERS 18 (June 2000) (noting that although 43 percent of the 
investigations involved 10 firearms or less, trafficking in large numbers of 
firearms does occur, indicated by the two largest numbers of firearms reported 
in connection with a single investigation, 10,000 and 11,000 firearms tracked 
respectively), available at, http://www.atf.treas.gov/pub/fire-explo_pub/pdf/ 
followingthegun_internet.pdf. 
159 Id. at 12. See also COMMERCE IN FIREARMS IN THE UNITED STATES 
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primarily due to their unfettered access to large numbers of 
guns.160 Gun dealers, distributors, and manufacturers are well 
aware of the role straw purchases and multiple sales play in the 
underground criminal gun market, yet they have refused to 
address these significant problems for too long. Despite the 
ability to place at the least minimal restrictions on the ways in 
which their products are sold, gun dealers, distributors and 
manufacturers have continued business as usual. 
B. Defectively Designed Guns Facilitate the Flood of Guns 
into the Underground Market 
In addition to the factors examined above, guns are easily 
trafficked due to significant design flaws. For example, serial 
numbers provide the most effective method to trace a gun and 
determine ownership, yet the weapons are manufactured in such 
a way that this vital piece of information can be easily removed 
or destroyed. Remedying this and other egregious manufacturing 
flaws would curb re-sale and trafficking of guns and prevent 
harm to innocent victims. Moreover, defective gun 
manufacturing results in numerous accidental deaths and 
injuries.161 
                                                          
supra note 140, at 21 (noting a Northeastern University-ATF study showing the 
small number of licensees associated with the disproportionately large 
percentage of crime guns traced in 1994). 
160 See Braga & Kennedy, supra note 147, at 15 (explaining that gun shows 
provide licensed dealers access to a large volume of firearms and thus, a corrupt 
licensed dealer can illegally divert large numbers of firearms). 
161 See, e.g., General Accounting Office Report, Accidental Shooting: 
Many Deaths and Injuries Caused by Firearms Could Be Prevented, GAO-
PEMD-91-9, at 2-3 (1991) (discussing safety devices that could have prevented 
accidental shootings and help save lives). The GAO examined 107 case records 
on accidental gunshot deaths during 1988 and 1989 from the randomly selected 
jurisdictions. It found that 8% and 23% of the deaths it examined could have 
been avoided with the presence of two design features, child-proof safety device 
and loaded-indicators, respectively. 
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1. Tamper-Proof Serial Numbers Would Curb the Underground 
Trafficking of Guns 
The serial number on a gun allows regulators and law 
enforcement personnel to trace the weapon to its origin and 
determine ownership. Many guns, however, are sold with serial 
numbers that can be easily removed with household tools such as, 
hammers, drills or grinding wheels.162 Data from 1998 revealed 
that between 9 percent and 20 percent of all guns recovered by 
law enforcement agencies had their serial numbers tampered with 
in some fashion or form.163 In 1999, a survey of 11 cities 
indicated that up to 9 percent of recovered crime guns had 
obliterated serial numbers.164 ATF Studies show that traffickers 
regularly destroy serial numbers to prevent weapons from being 
traced,165 even though obliteration of a serial number is a federal 
crime, as is possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial 
number.166 Additionally, the ATF has recognized obliterated 
                                                          
162 See David Kreighbaum, Obliterated Serial Numbers, 2 CGAB SHOTS 
Vol. 3, 1 (Mar. 1998); James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Criminal Law: 
Comprehensive Handgun Licensing & Registration: An Analysis and Critique of 
Brady II, Gun Control’s Next (and Last?) Step, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
81, 103 (1998); DAVID KENNEDY, JUVENILE GUN VIOLENCE AND GUN MARKETS 
IN BOSTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, available at http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/ 
fs000160.txt (last visited Mar. 16, 2003); Americans for Gun Safety, 
http://ww2.americansforgunsafety.com (last visited Mar. 16, 2003). 
163 See Martha Brognard, Obliterated Serial Number Restoration, 2 CGAB 
SHOTS Vol. 6, 1 (Aug. 1998). 
164 U.S. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO, AND FIREARMS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, CRIME GUN TRACE REPORTS, 1999: National Report 39 (2000). 
165 See David M. Kennedy et al., Youth Violence in Boston: Gun Markets, 
Serious Youth Offenders, and a Use-Reduction Strategy, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 147, 174 (1996) (providing the reasons people obliterate serial numbers: 
To avoid being tied to a crime which was committed while using that particular 
fire arm, and to avoid being identified as a seller or buyer of a gun involved in 
crime). 
166 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(k) (2003) (making it unlawful to sell, transport, or 
deal with a firearm in which a serial number has been obliterated, removed, or 
altered); see also DEP’T OF TREAS. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, & 
FIREARMS, CRIME GUN TRACE REPORTS: The Illegal Youth Firearms Markets in 
27 Communities at 6 (1999) (investigating the illegal trafficking of firearms to 
BHOWMIK MACRO 3-27.DOC 4/1/03  2:39 PM 
 GUN INDUSTRY ACCOUNTABILITY 113 
serial numbers as a “key trafficking indicator,”167 because the 
“intentional obliteration of a serial number is intended to make it 
difficult for law enforcement officials to identify the last licensed 
seller and first unlicensed purchaser of a firearm.”168 
Because of the prevalent use of guns with obliterated serial 
numbers in crimes, law enforcement has developed methods to 
restore obliterated serial numbers in an effort to curb gun 
trafficking.169 The most effective means of combating such 
destruction, however, is not restoration, but prevention through 
tamper-proof serial numbers.170 As a result, the ATF recently 
imposed standards requiring serial numbers “to meet minimum 
height and depth requirements that will make them more resistant 
to obliteration.”171 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has 
implemented regulations requiring a second hidden tamper-proof 
serial number on each handgun sold in the state.172 Gun 
                                                          
the youth and juvenile and directing the information at reducing illegal access to 
firearms in 27 communities in the United States)[hereinafter ATF GUN TRACE 
REPORTS]. 
167 ATF GUN TRACE REPORTS, supra note 166, at 7 (explaining that 
obliterating serial numbers indicates trafficking because it, “shows that someone 
in the chain of possession assumes that the gun will be used for a crime, may 
have to be discarded by a criminal, or may be recovered by the police”). 
168 Id. at 12-13. See also Kennedy et al., supra note 165, at 174. 
169 See GUN VIOLENCE REDUCTION, supra note 114. One of these methods 
would require the restoration of obliterated serial numbers. Id. at 29. Another 
method would use ballistics technology to trace bullets or bullet casings to the 
guns from which they were fired. This would require that detailed characteristics 
of guns be recorded in a central system so that examiners would be able to 
electronically compare the bullets found at crime scenes to the guns recorded in 
the ballistics system. Id. at 28-29. 
170 Id. 
171 Id.; see also 27 C.F.R. § 178.92 (2002) (describing information that 
must be placed on firearm, including serial number); 27 C.F.R. § 179.102 (2002) 
(describing how firearms must be identified for firearms made on or after 
January 30, 2002, “for firearms manufactured, imported, or made on and after 
January 30, 2002, the engraving, casting, or stamping (impressing) of the serial 
number must be to a minimum depth of .003 inch and in a print size no smaller 
than 1/16 inch”). 
172 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 16.00 (1987) (mandating a handgun drop 
test, prohibiting sales of handguns made from inferior products and prohibiting 
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manufacturers have proven capable of meeting the new 
requirement, exhibiting that the gun industry can implement 
minimal changes in the design of guns that can greatly assist law 
enforcement.173 
2. Personalized Gun Technology Would Curb the Sales of Guns 
in the Underground Market 
There are a number of other design changes that, if 
implemented, would prevent unauthorized gun use, decrease the 
number of accidental deaths and injuries and minimize illegal 
trafficking of guns.174 Ranging from basic locking devices to 
sophisticated user recognition technology, these modifications are 
affordable, reliable, and effective.175 Most importantly, however, 
the majority of these mechanisms are currently available to gun 
manufacturers, should they wish to employ them.176 
                                                          
the sale of handguns without either a chamber loaded indicator or a magazine 
disconnect safety). 
173 Pamela Ferdinand, Massachusetts Gun Laws Take Heavy Toll on Sales, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2001, at A3 (discussing how new Massachusetts gun 
safety regulations, including a requirement that all guns sold have tamper 
resistant serial numbers, have reduced handgun sales in the state). 
174 See generally Bang, supra note 1 (discussing new California firearm 
safety regulations, including laws requiring locks on firearms); James T. Dixon, 
On Lemon Squeezers and Locking Devices: Consumer Product Safety and 
Firearms, A Modest Proposal, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 979 (1997) (discussing 
firearm safety devices, including trigger locks, that can help prevent accidental 
shootings and unauthorized use of guns); Unintentional Firearm-Related 
Fatalities Among Children and Teenagers—United States 1982-1988, 41 
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 25 (Centers for Disease Control) June 
26, 1992, at 445 (finding that “the addition of child proof safety devices would 
prevent children aged [six years and younger] from discharging a firearm”). 
175 See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, SMART GUN TECHNOLOGY 
PROJECT- FINAL REPORT (1996) [hereinafter SMART GUN TECHNOLOGY 
PROJECT] (noting that this is the same technology used to detect shoplifting in 
department stores), available at http://infoserve.sandia.gov/sand_doc/1996/9611 
31.pdf; See Joseph D’Agnese, Smart Guns Don’t Kill Kids, DISCOVER, Sept. 
1999, at 90 (discussing personalization devices such as fingerprint lock, the 
magnetic lock, and the electromagnetic lock). 
176 But see Paul M. Barrett & Vanessa O’Connell, Personal Weapon: How 
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Basic trigger locks are external additions to guns and include 
everything from pad-locks intended to immobilize the trigger to 
more advanced apparatus that replace the grip of the handgun and 
require a combination to release the lock.177 Integrated locks, 
such as those provided by the gun manufacturer Taurus, use an 
internal lock to secure the gun.178 This patented security system 
“engages with the turn of a special key to render the firearm 
inoperative, and is entirely contained within the firearm with no 
parts to misplace.”179 This is “the first integral system provided 
by a manufacturer to help prevent unauthorized use by 
children.”180 Even the most advanced forms of trigger locks, 
however, cannot prevent all accidents.181 
The most effective, sophisticated manufacturing modifications 
include personalization technology that enables a gun to 
                                                          
a Gun Company Tries to Propel Itself Into the Computer Age, WALL ST. J., May 
12, 1999, at 1-3 (discussing Colt Manufacturing Compnay’s development of 
personalized gun technology and offering opposing viewpoints on the market-
readiness of such technology); Taurus News and Reviews (May 5, 2001) 
(announcing firearm manufacturer’s new user identification technology, 
although recognizing no imminent date for commercial release due to 
environmental sensitivity and power source limitation), at http://www.taurususa. 
com/news.html. 
177 See Bang, supra note 1, at 266, 268-70 (2000); see also, Cynthia 
Leonardatos, Paul H. Blackman & David B. Kopel, Smart Guns/Foolish 
Legislators: Finding the Right Public Safety Laws, and Avoiding the Wrong 
Ones, 34 CONN. L. REV. 157 (2001) (discussing the effectiveness of various 
types of gun locks and personalization devices). 
178 Press Release, Taurus Int’l Mfg., Inc., Taurus Renews Offer to 
Immediately Share Patented Gun Safety System with Smith & Wesson (Mar. 20, 
2000), available at http://www.taurususa.com/news.html. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 See Bang, supra note 1, at 273-74 (noting that the use of trigger locks 
may create an even greater risk for potential unauthorized gun use by children). 
For example, if a user inadvertently attaches the trigger lock to a loaded gun, the 
gun could mistakenly go off when the user attempts to remove the device. Id. In 
addition, gun owners could depend too heavily upon a trigger lock to prevent 
accidental injury, creating a false sense of security, resulting in accidents due to 
a failure by parents to properly educate their children regarding the dangers of 
unauthorized gun use. Id. 
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“recognize” the authorized user.182 Cost effective, reliable 
designs include radio frequency tags in the handgun and on the 
shooter, often worn as a ring or a bracelet.183 The tag in the gun 
must match that worn by the shooter for the gun to operate.184 
Personalization technology, therefore, prevents gun use by 
anyone other than licensed, authorized users. 
Wide-spread manufacturing of personalized guns would also 
curb the proliferation of criminal activity and illicit gun 
trafficking by drastically limiting the utility of stolen firearms.185 
Because thieves are unable to use guns with personalized 
technology, this would also reduce the number of homicides. At 
least one study has shown that almost 50 percent of all shootings, 
both intentional and unintentional, could have been prevented if a 
personalization device was placed on the gun.186 This 
fundamental design change would both save innocent lives and 
decrease the threat that guns, and criminals, pose to society at 
                                                          
182 See Johns Hopkins Center For Gun Policy and Research, Personalized 
Guns: Reducing Gun Deaths Through Design Changes (Sept. 1996) [hereinafter 
Personalized Guns], at http:www.pcvp.org/pcvp/firearms/pubs/lock.shtml; see 
also MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 16.00 (1987) (discussing devises including 
magnetic resonance devices that require the user to wear a special bracelet or 
ring, radio frequency identification, and touch memory devices, among others); 
see also, SMART GUN TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, supra note 175. 
183 See Personalized Guns, supra note 182. 
184 SMART GUN TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, supra note 175. 
185 See Jon S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, A Public Health Approach to 
Regulating Firearms as Consumer Products, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1193, 1198-99 
(April 2000) (positing that personalized guns may be used only by authorized 
user, and hypothesizing therefore that homicides could be prevented because 
those who steal the guns may not use them to murder others); Marianne W. 
Zawitz, Firearms, Crime, and Criminal Justice: Guns Used in Crime, 
Department of Justice, United States Department of Justice, July 1995, at 3 
(citing statistics that “15% of the adult offenders and 19% of the juvenile 
offenders had stolen guns; 16% of the adults and 24% of the juveniles had kept a 
stolen gun, and 20% of the adults and 30% of the juveniles had sold or traded a 
stolen gun”; and citing studies of adult and juvenile offenders indicating that 
many offenders have stolen, possessed, or traded stolen fire arms). 
186 See Center to Protect Handgun Violence, A School Year in the USA 
(Oct. 1988) (analyzing 137 reports of gun violence culled from newspaper 
reports and news websites across the country). 
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large.187 
Personalization technology is more than a fantastical item on 
the wish list of gun control advocates. Many inventors have 
developed workable prototypes that can be implemented on guns 
today to make them safer.188 A recent study by the National 
Institute of Justice described this technology as both affordable 
and available to gun manufacturers.189 At least one manufacturer 
has announced that it has a pistol “with user identifying 
technology,” using battery-powered fingerprint reader 
technology.190 
Not surprisingly, many in the gun industry have attempted to 
delay, if not derail, efforts to develop personalized gun 
technology.191 Rather than proactively implementing design 
changes that help reduce crime, assist law enforcement, and even 
save lives, the gun industry has stonewalled attempts at 
innovation and even tacitly supported boycotts of industry 
members who strayed from the party line.192 The industry refuses 
to provide consumers with the safest product possible and has 
failed to promote widespread technological advancement. 
                                                          
187 See Personalized Guns, supra note 182; see also Vernick & Teret, supra 
note 185, at 1204 (predicting that personalized guns might prevent some of the 
deaths caused by unauthorized users such as juveniles and criminals who disarm 
a police officer). 
188 See Joseph D’Agnese, Smart Guns Don’t Kill Kids, DISCOVER, Sept. 
1999, at 90 (describing gun manufacturers’ efforts to develop smart gun 
technology, such as fingerprinting, magnetic, electromagnetic and radio lock 
guns). 
189 SMART GUN TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, supra note 175. 
190 See Taurus News and Reviews, supra note 176 (explaining that the 
prototype is a polymer frame 9mm pistol). 
191 David B. Ottaway, A Boon to Sales, or a Threat? Safety Devices Split 
Industry, WASH. POST, May 20, 1999, at A1 (explaining industry members’ 
opposition to development of new safety technology because it is seen as “a first 
step toward mandatory federal safety measures”). See also Margie Hyslop, 
“Smart Gun” Law Pushed in Md.; Glendening to Fight for Childproofing, 
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1999, at A1 (discussing opposition to smart gun 
technology by major gun manufacturers). 
192 See Ottaway, supra note 191, at A1 (noting gun manufacturers’ 
opposition, specifically Beretta U.S.A. Corp, to smart gun technology). 
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C. Gun Makers Know They Are a Substantial Factor in the 
Creation and Maintenance of the Underground Gun 
Market 
The main sources for illegally trafficked firearms have been 
well documented throughout the past few decades and gun 
manufacturers are aware that their designs and methods of 
distribution facilitate the operation of the underground market.193 
Moreover, gun manufacturers are repeatedly informed that their 
products are being sold to dangerous individuals through the 
underground market.194 They persistently refuse, however, to 
take simple, positive steps to curb the flow of their products into 
this illegal and hazardous forum. 
1. Gun Tracing Serves as Notice to Gun Makers Regarding the 
Criminal Use of Their Products 
Even with the problem of destroyed serial numbers and the 
loopholes present in record-keeping requirements, gun makers 
receive thousands of formal notices every year that the guns they 
manufacture and distribute are diverted to criminal misuse.195 
One important mechanism for notification is tracing, which is 
“the systematic tracking of the movement of a firearm recovered 
by law enforcement officials from its first sale by the 
                                                          
193 See Hass Affidavit, supra note 133, at 20-21 (explaining that although 
Smith & Wesson and the industry as a whole are fully aware of the extent of the 
criminal misuse of firearms, the industry’s position has consistently been to take 
no independent action to insure responsible distribution practices). Furthermore, 
none of the principal U.S. firearms manufacturers take additional steps to 
investigate, screen or supervise the wholesale distributors and retail outlets that 
sell their products to insure that their products are distributed responsibly. Id. 
194 See COMMERCE IN FIREARMS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 140, at 
19-20 (detailing crime gun tracing, which includes contacting the gun 
manufacturer to determine the first retail transaction); see also, Philip J. Cook & 
Anthony A. Braga, Comprehensive Firearms Tracing: Strategic and 
Investigative Uses of New Data on Firearms Markets, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 277 
(2001) (discussing the proper interpretation and use of data obtained from 
firearms tracing to affect gun control laws and criminal enforcement actions). 
195 Id. 
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manufacturer or importer through the distribution chain 
(wholesaler/retailer) to the first retail purchase.”196 Law 
enforcement officials contact the ATF at the National Tracing 
Center (“NTC”), which then conducts a trace by checking out-
of-business FFLs and multiple sales records.197 If these sources 
do not uncover the first retail transaction, the NTC notifies the 
importer or manufacturer of the gun and tracks the recovered 
weapon through the wholesaler and retailer distribution chain “to 
the retail dealer, requesting the dealer to examine his records to 
determine the identity of the first retail purchaser.”198 Thus, the 
ATF contacts the manufacturer each time it initiates a trace of a 
gun used in crime.199 This happens hundreds of thousands of 
times each year.200 
Comprehensive tracing data “can provide guidance to the 
regulatory—and criminal—enforcement activities of ATF and 
more generally provide a statistical basis for understanding the 
supply side of the gun violence problem.”201 Accordingly, this 
tracing data, much of which gun manufacturers, distributors and 
dealers, can access, can be used to determine who is consistently 
selling guns that end up in crime.202 As Forest G. Webb, a 
special agent of the ATF in charge of the NTC, told Taurus 
International Manufacturing, “[i]f your corporation determines 
that there is an unusually high number of Taurus Firearms being 
traced to certain” wholesalers and dealers “we suggest you look 
                                                          
196 See COMMERCE IN FIREARMS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 140, at 
19. 
197 Id. The NTC is an agency that tracks guns recovered in crime. Id. 
198 See id. at 20. 
199 Although manufacturers are aware of traces about which they are 
contacted, they are not currently informed about traces resolved by searches of 
the out-of-business records or multiple sales report information. Id. 
200 See Cook & Braga, supra note 194, at 278 (noting that law-enforcement 
agencies confiscate hundreds of thousands of firearms every year). 
201 Id. 
202 While access to the raw tracing data is only available via special 
request, annual reports digesting the trace data are available from the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND 
FIREARMS, CRIME GUN TRACE REPORTS, available at http://www.atf.treas. 
gov/firearms/ycgii/2000/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2003). 
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at their business practices more carefully.”203 Unfortunately, like 
others in the gun industry that refuse to take steps to stop the 
flow of guns to the underground market, Taurus never acted on 
this suggestion.204 
2. The Gun Industry Knows That It Has the Power to Curb the 
Underground Gun Market 
Gun makers know the role their conduct plays in the 
proliferation of the underground market.205 As a former gun 
company executive, Robert Hass, who served as Senior Vice-
President of Marketing and Sales for Smith & Wesson recognized 
in a sworn statement: 
[Smith & Wesson] and the industry as a whole are fully 
aware of the extent of the criminal misuse of handguns. 
The company and the industry are also aware that the 
black market in handguns is not simply the result of stolen 
guns but is due to the seepage of guns into the illicit 
market from multiple thousands of unsupervised federal 
handgun licensees.206 
Gun dealers acknowledge the industry’s refusal to take 
responsibility for their participation in the crime gun market. 
Hass noted in his sworn affidavit that “the industry’s position has 
consistently been to take no independent action to insure 
responsible distribution practices, to maintain . . . minimal 
federal regulation of . . . handgun licensees . . . and to call for 
greater criminal enforcement of those who commit crimes with 
                                                          
203 See Fox Butterfield, Letter Is Crucial in Lawsuit On Liability of Gun 
Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2002, at A17 (discussing letter from ATF to 
Taurus International instructing gun company Taurus to investigate wholesalers 
and dealers that repeatedly show up in crime gun traces). 
204 Id. (noting that “Taurus never acted on Mr. Webb’s advice”). 
205 18 U.S.C. §922 (1994). The Gun Control Act of 1968 grants gun makers 
and law enforcement officials the power to “determine the chain of commerce 
for a firearm from the point of import or manufacture to the first retail sale.” Id. 
See also Cook & Braga, supra note 194, at 277. 
206 See Hass Affidavit, supra note 133, at 20. 
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guns as the solution to the firearm crime problem.”207 One 
firearms dealer, named 1993 Dealer of the Year by the National 
Alliance of Stocking Gun Dealers, expressed similar sentiments 
in Shooting Sport Retailer, an industry trade magazine.208 He 
stated: 
I’ve been told INNUMERABLE times by various 
manufacturers that they ‘have no control’ over their 
channel of distribution. I’ve been told INNUMERABLE 
times that once a firearm is sold to a distributor, there is 
no way a manufacturer can be held responsible for the 
legal transfer and possession of a firearm . . . . IF YOU 
DO NOT KNOW WHERE AND HOW YOUR 
PRODUCTS ARE ULTIMATELY BEING SOLD - YOU 
SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OR ANTICIPATED THAT 
THEY WOULD BE ILLEGALLY SOLD AND 
SUBSEQUENTLY MISUSED. Let’s just get down and 
dirty. We manufacture, distribute, and retail items of 
deadly force. . . . Your arguments of yesterday regarding 
lack of accountability were pretty flimsy. Today, they are 
tenuous at best. Tomorrow, they are not going to 
indemnify you. We are going to have to get a whole lot 
better—and fast—of being in control of our distribution 
channel.209 
Gun manufacturers nevertheless deliberately employ a “hands 
off” approach to distribution.210 This is largely because the 
underground market is an important source of revenue for gun 
makers and loss of these sales would mean a significant decline 
in profits for gun makers.211 Although the magnitude of the 
                                                          
207 Id. 
208 See Robert Lockett, The Implications of New York City, SHOOTING 
SPORTS RETAILER, 18-20, July/August 1999. Lockett is the proprietor of the 
Second Amendment gun shop in Overland Park, Kansas. Id. 
209 Id. 
210 See Bhowmik, supra note 92, at 48-49 (noting that despite their 
knowledge of the criminal misuse of guns acquired in the underground market, 
gun makers continue to willingly supply the market). 
211 Only 10% of the guns recovered by the ATF are stolen property. See 
Federal Firearms Licensing Hearing, supra note 150, at 31. Given the volume 
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underground market cannot be calculated with mathematical 
certainty, the significance of the primary market for provision of 
firearms to the illicit market is beyond refute.212 
What is and has been ascertainable, however, is the 
importance of the primary market for guns to the illicit market. 
One former ATF Director noted that “access to lawful channels 
of firearms in commerce is overwhelmingly attractive to 
criminals. Quantity and selection that cannot be provided 
consistently by home burglaries can only be obtained through the 
retail market.”213 
In light of the overwhelming evidence of negligently designed 
and distributed firearms, steps must be taken to abate the 
monumental effects of these hazards. The gun industry is in the 
best position to respond to this problem, because it has both 
knowledge of the issues and the ability to implement remedial 
changes. Gun manufacturers and retailers, however, continue to 
conduct business as usual, with express exemption from federal 
consumer product safety laws and absent the threat of potential 
liability. The industry’s refusal to act demonstrates a desire to 
maximize profits in utter disregard for human life and safety. 
IV. AN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH ACCOUNTABILITY: THE RISE OF 
CITY SUITS AGAINST GUN MANUFACTURERS AND THE 
INDUSTRY’S RESPONSE TO THE LITIGATION 
A new wave of city-suit litigation attempts to hold the gun 
                                                          
of guns recovered in crime, it is likely that the 90% not stolen are a strong 
source of revenue for gun makers. See Bhowmik, supra note 92, at 58 
(referencing Archer v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-912658 NZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. 
1999), in which plaintiffs claimed gun manufacturers actively encouraged an 
illegal secondary market in firearms). Bhowmik notes that “[s]traw purchases, 
multiple sales, sales to minors, and diversion of guns to felons and other 
unauthorized purchasers were not only encouraged but exploited and relied upon 
as a vital source of revenue.” 
212 See Federal Firearms Licensing Hearing, supra note 150, at 17, 31 
(including testimony by the Director of ATF Stephen E. Higgins before 
Congressional Committee stating that “virtually all [criminal] guns at some 
point pass through a licensed dealer’s inventory”). 
213 Id. at 32. 
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industry accountable for the negligent design and distribution of 
its products and is forcing the industry to implement changes in 
the way it does business.214 While these reforms are not a 
panacea, they mark an important first step towards altering the 
way gun manufacturers and retailers conduct their trade and 
demonstrate that the industry has the means to prevent the sale of 
guns to criminals and other prohibited purchasers. 
These city suits have been met with mixed results.215 Some 
courts have dismissed claims for negligent design and distribution 
of guns.216 For example, in 1999, Wayne County, Michigan and 
the City of Detroit filed a lawsuit against gun manufacturers and 
distributors for public nuisance and negligent marketing and 
distribution of guns.217 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendants used a policy of active encouragement and willful 
blindness to facilitate the creation of an illegal secondary market 
                                                          
214 See, e.g., Complaint, City of New York v. Arms Tech., Inc., (E.D.N.Y 
200) (N0. 1:00-cv-3641); First Amended Complaint, City of Boston v. Smith & 
Wesson, (Ma. Super. Ct. 2000) (No. 1999-02590); Complaint, District of 
Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., (No. 00-0000428); Complaint, People of 
California ex rel. Hahn v. Arcadia Machine & Tool, (Cal. Super. 1999) (No. 
BC210894); Complaint, People of California ex rel. Renne v. Arcadia Machine 
& Tool, (Cal. Super. 1999)(No. 303753); Complaint, City of St. Louis v. 
Cernicek, (Mo. Cir. Ct. 199) (No. 992-01209); Complaint, City of Cincinnati v. 
Beretta Corp., (Oh. Ct. C.P. 1999) (No. A9902369); Complaint, White v. Hi-
Point Firearms, (Oh. Ct. C.P. 1999)(No. 381897); Complaint, Archer v. Arms 
Tech., (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1999)(No 99-912658); Complaint, City of Atlanta v. 
Smith & Wesson Corp., (Ca. Cty. Ct. 1999)(No. 99vs0149217j); Complaint, 
Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., (La. D.C. 1998)(No. 98-18575). 
215 See, e.g., Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882 
(E.D. Pa. 2000) upheld, 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that gun industry’s 
methods for distributing guns were neitehr negligent nor a public nuisance); 
Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 
536 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that manufactures’ lawful distribution of handguns 
was not a public nuisance and manufacturers could not be held liable for 
negligent misuse by third party); City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 12 
Mass. L. Rptr. 225 (Mass. Super. 2000). 
216 See Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d at 415. See also 
Camden County Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders, 273 F.3d at 536. 
217 Archer v. Arms Tech., Inc. 72 F. Supp. 2d 784 (E.D. Mich. 1999); 
McNamara v. Arms Tech., Inc. 71 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D. Mich. 1999). 
BHOWMIK MACRO 3-27.DOC 4/1/03 2:39 PM 
124 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
in firearms.218 They contended that, as a result of defendants’ 
active encouragement and reliance upon straw purchases, 
multiple sales, sales to minors, and diversion of guns to felons 
and unauthorized purchasers, thousands of firearms were placed 
in the hands of criminals, juveniles, and other dangerous people 
for the use in crimes.219 The court upheld the public nuisance 
claim.220 But the negligent marketing and distribution claim was 
dismissed because the court found that the defendant gun 
manufacturers did not owe the plaintiffs a duty to use reasonable 
care to prevent foreseeable injuries resulting from the negligent 
sale of their products.221 
Other courts have held gun manufacturers liable for negligent 
behavior that results in injury to a city.222 In White v. Smith & 
Wesson, Corp., the City of Cleveland filed claims against gun 
manufacturer Smith & Wesson under the Ohio Products Liability 
Act,223 as well as state common law claims of negligent design, 
unjust enrichment, public nuisance, negligent distribution,224 and 
a statutory claim for nuisance abatement.225 The defendant argued 
that the case should be dismissed for “three overarching reasons” 
– (1) as a matter of public policy; (2) for failure to state a claim 
                                                          
218 See Plaintiff’s Complaint, Archer, No. 99-912658 NZ ¶2 at 3 (Apr. 26, 
1999), at http://www.firearmslitigation.org/content/pdf/detroit/detroit_ 
complaint.pdf. 
219 Id. at 3, 20, 50. 
220 Archer v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-912658 NZ, slip op. at 12 (Mich. 
Cir. Ct. May 16, 2000) (on remand from the federal district court, Archer, 72 F. 
Supp. 2d 784). 
221 Id. at 6 (stating that crime prevention “is simply not a cognizable legal 
duty owed by these Defendants to these Plaintiffs.”).. 
222 White v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 828 (N.D. Ohio 
2000) (alleging that as a result of defendants’ unreasonably dangerous and 
negligently designed handguns that the city suffered harm, lost substantial tax 
revenue due to lower productivity and was obligated to pay millions of dollars in 
enhanced police protection, emergency services, police pension benefits, court 
and jail costs, and medical care). 
223 White, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 819-30, citing Ohio Products Liability Act, 
Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2307.7-2307.79. 
224 White, 97 F. Supp. at 830. 
225 White, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 819, citing Cleveland City Code § 203.01, 
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under Ohio law; and (3) because the claims encroached upon the 
United States Constitution.226 The District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio denied the defendant’s motion in full, relying in 
part on state law precedent recognizing that the grave, 
foreseeable risk posed by guns warrants the imposition of a duty 
to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands.227 The court 
noted that “[a] duty of care for the protection of a plaintiff 
against an unreasonable risk of injury is owed to all people ‘to 
whom injury may reasonably be anticipated.’”228 
In another significant case, the City of Cincinnati claimed that 
gun manufacturers and distributors negligently distributed and 
marketed their products, resulting in both a public nuisance and 
injury to the city.229 The Supreme Court of Ohio overturned the 
                                                          
226 White, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 829-30. Regarding the public policy argument, 
the court held that it “does not dismiss cases based on public policy; rather, a 
case will be dismissed if it fails ‘to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.’” Id. at 820. The court analyzed each of the state law claims in detail 
and concluded that each stated a claim under Ohio law. Id. at 821-829. The court 
also rejected the defendants’ argument that plaintiffs’ claims were “an attempt to 
regulate a lawful national industry” and barred by the Commerce Clause and the 
Due Process Clause. Id. at 829. The court found that “[p]laintiffs. . . are 
attempting to protect their own citizens and economy, and to recover for their 
own injuries and losses. Plaintiff’s claims, like any other product liability claim 
that implicates a national manufacturer, are not barred by the United States 
Constitution.” Id. at 829-30. 
227 White v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 828 (articulating 
that the City of Cleveland alleged negligent design and distribution of guns by 
gun manufacturers and dealers caused injury and public nuisance). The court 
relied in part on Pavlides v. Niles Gun Show, Inc., in which the Ohio Court of 
Appeals held that a gun show operator could be liable for a criminal shooting by 
teenagers using a gun they stole from a dealer at the show. That court found that 
the operator negligently failed to prevent minors from entering the show and 
negligently failed to require dealers at the show to take appropriate security 
measures to prevent thefts. See also Pavlides v. Niles Gun Show, Inc, 679 
N.E.2d 728 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
228 White, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 828; see also, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2307.71 
(Anderson 1999) (citing instances in the state products liability code where a 
product is deemed defective due to inadequate warning or instruction). 
229 See Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002). 
The City alleged that the gun manufacturers’ negligence violated the common 
right of Cincinnati residents to be free from conduct that interferes with their 
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lower court’s dismissal of the city’s case.230 The court 
summarized the city’s argument that “appellees created a 
nuisance through their ongoing conduct of marketing, 
distributing, and selling firearms in a manner that facilitated their 
flow into the illegal market. Thus . . . appellees control the 
creation and supply of this illegal, secondary market for firearms, 
not the actual use of the firearms that cause injury.”231 The court 
concluded that, “just as the individuals who fire the guns are held 
accountable for the injuries sustained, appellees can be held liable 
for creating the alleged nuisance.”232 
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts also denied gun 
manufacturers’ motion to dismiss a case brought by the City of 
Boston.233 Although defendants contended that they “did not owe 
Plaintiffs a duty to protect from the criminal acts of third 
parties,” the court recognized that this argument misconstrued 
the complaint.234 The court clarified its position by stating that the 
“[p]laintiffs do not allege that Defendants were negligent for 
failure to protect from harm but that Defendants engaged in 
conduct the foreseeable result of which was to cause harm to 
Plaintiffs.”235 The court further explained that: 
                                                          
health, welfare, and safety. Id. at 1141. The City further argued that appellees’ 
negligent conduct sustained a secondary, illegal market for firearms, ensuring 
that the firearms would end up in the hands of persons with criminal purposes. 
Id. 
230 Id. at 1151 (overturning dismissal). 
231 Id. at 1143. 
232 Id., citing City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 2000 WL 1473568, 
14 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000) (noting that liability extends to all who join or 
participate in the creation or maintenance of a public nuisance). 
233 See City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 2000 WL 147 at 1 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. 2000). Although the City of Boston prevailed against defendants’ 
motion to dismiss, the high cost of litigation caused the City to voluntarily 
dismiss the case in March 2002. See Raja Mishra, Boston Drops Lawsuit on 
Guns: Growing Cost Cited in Case vs. 31 Firms, BOSTON GLOBE, March 28, 
2002, at A1 (reporting that budget cuts and legal costs of over $30,000 a month 
contributed to the city’s decision to drop the case). 
234 Smith & Wesson Corp., 2000 WL 1473568 at *6 (rejecting defendants’ 
contention that the plaintiffs’ complaint asked the court to impose such a duty). 
235 Id. at 15 (explaining the plaintiffs’ allegation that the defendants 
engaged in affirmative misconduct). 
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Taking Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, Defendants have 
engaged in affirmative acts (i.e. creating an illegal 
secondary firearms market) by failing to exercise adequate 
control over the distribution of their firearms. Thus it is 
affirmative conduct that is alleged – the creation of the 
illegal secondary firearms market. The method by which 
Defendants created this market, it is alleged, is by 
designing or selling firearms without regard to the 
likelihood the firearms would be placed in the hands of 
juveniles, felons or others not permitted to use firearms in 
Boston. Further, according to the complaint, Defendants 
did this [knowing that the firearms would end up in that 
market, and] depending upon precisely that result, 
realizing that Plaintiffs would be harmed. Taken as true, 
these facts suffice to allege that Defendants’ conduct 
unreasonably exposed Plaintiffs to a risk of harm.236 
While courts have reached different conclusions on the 
application of common law tort claims to the gun industry’s 
wrongdoings, lawsuits have helped reveal the means by which 
the gun industry knowingly supplies and profits from the 
underground gun market.237 Cities’ claims have eroded the shield 
of preemptive statutes and special treatment and, in response to 
demands for redress, the gun industry has made minor changes in 
the way it does business.238 Although, these changes are far from 
                                                          
236 Id. 
237 See, e.g., Butterfield, supra note 203, at A17 (reporting that a central 
argument in the cities’ case against the gun industry alleging that gun 
manufacturers are liable for tort of public nuisance is bolstered by the discovery 
of a letter sent by ATF, urging the manufacturer to trace how and where its 
products were being sold, was ignored by the company). See also Richard C. 
Ausness, Tort Liability for the Sale of Non-defective Products: An Analysis and 
Critique of the Concept of Negligent Marketing, 53 S.C. L. REV. 907 (2002) 
(discussing the controversial tort of negligent marketing that is being put forth in 
cases against the gun industry and would impose a duty on gun manufacturers to 
more carefully market their products so as to prevent guns from falling into the 
wrong hands). 
238 See Burnett, supra note 48, at 481 (describing changes in the gun 
industry, such as Colt Manufacturing Company’s decision to eliminate 
production of seven of its lines of consumer handguns and Smith & Wesson’s 
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adequate, they demonstrate the industry’s recognition of the role 
it plays in trafficking guns to criminals and minors. Sadly, 
however, if these changes had been made years ago, a great 
number of lives could have been saved. 
As retailers’ sole source of handguns, gun makers are 
uniquely positioned to restrict or limit the manner in which guns 
are sold, thereby preventing guns from being obtained by 
criminals. Manufacturers could ask distributors and dealers to 
apprise them of any information, including multiple sales, trace 
requests or criminal indictments.239 Manufacturers, however, 
have refused to take precautionary measures. As a result of the 
municipal litigation against gun manufacturers, this behavior has 
begun to change. 
For example, Smith & Wesson, one of the nation’s largest 
                                                          
pact with the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the 
Department of the Treasury, New York and Connecticut Attorneys General and 
the mayors of many of the cities suing the gun industry at that time). See Matt 
Bai, Clouds Over Gun Valley, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 23, 1999, at 34 (discussing gun 
industry’s overtures to the ATF, including signals that the industry would be 
willing to monitor sales to cut down on illegal trafficking). 
239 See GUN VIOLENCE REDUCTION, supra note 114, at 26. The DOJ 
acknowledged the great importance of “industry self-policing” in the interest of 
public safety: 
The firearms industry can make a significant contribution to public 
safety by adopting measures to police its own distribution chain. In 
many industries, such as the fertilizer and explosives industries, 
manufacturers impose extensive controls on their dealers and 
distributors. Gun manufacturers and importers could substantially 
reduce the illegal supply of guns by taking similar steps to control the 
chain of distribution for firearms. To properly control the distribution 
of firearms, gun manufacturers and importers should: identify and 
refuse to supply dealers and distributors that have a pattern of selling 
guns to criminals and straw purchasers; develop a continual training 
program for dealers and distributors covering compliance with firearms 
laws, identifying straw purchase scenarios and securing inventory; and 
develop a code of conduct for dealers and distributors, requiring them 
to implement inventory, store security, policy and record keeping 
measures to keep guns out of the wrong hands, including policies to 
postpone all gun transfers until NICS checks are completed.  
Id. 
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gun manufacturers, signed an agreement with various cities and 
federal agencies, agreeing to a marked change in the way they do 
business, including monitoring distributors and dealers for 
negligent behavior.240 Under the same settlement, Smith & 
Wesson agreed to use personalization technology in its new 
models within three years of the settlement, with curio and 
collectors’ models exempted from the requirement.241 Smith & 
Wesson also agreed to spend two percent of its revenues on 
developing personalization technology.242 
Even prior to that groundbreaking agreement, Smith & 
Wesson implemented some restrictions on their retailers’ 
conduct, and informed them that it might terminate sales to any 
dealer who did not agree to refrain from selling to straw 
purchasers or any other person whom the dealer had reason to 
believe made a false or misleading statement.243 After the City of 
Chicago videotaped and indicted two dealers engaging in straw 
purchases, Smith & Wesson terminated those dealers for 
violating the agreement.244 These actions clearly demonstrate that 
                                                          
240 See SMITH & WESSON: CLARIFICATION: SETTLEMENT DOCUMENT: 
AGREEMENT (March 17, 2000) [hereinafter SMITH & WESSON AGREEMENT], at 
http://www.gunnerynetwork/files/agreement.html. Under the terms of the Smith 
& Wesson settlement, the company agreed to change its distribution practices, 
including the following: Smith & Wesson will only allow their guns to be sold 
by authorized dealers and distributors who must abide by a set of terms and 
conditions governing who they can sell guns to. Id. at 6. See also James Dao, 
Under Legal Siege, Gun Maker Agrees to Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2000, at 
A1 (reporting the terms of Smith & Wesson’s settlement agreement, its 
significance and the impact it may, or may not, have on the gun manufacturing 
industry as a whole); Steven Wilmsen, Smith & Wesson, City Settle Lawsuit, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12, 2000, at B4 (reporting the terms of a separate 
settlement with the City of Boston which, while it is less ambitious in its terms 
than the March 2000 agreement, is a binding agreement). 
241 SMITH & WESSON AGREEMENT, supra note 240, at 2. 
242 Id. 
243 See David B. Ottaway & Barbara Vobejda, Gun Manufacturer Requires 
Dealers to Sign Code of Ethics, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1999, at A11 (detailing a 
code of ethics Smith & Wesson requires dealers selling its products to sign, 
pledging that they will avoid sales practices that facilitate the illegal flow of 
guns to young people and criminals). 
244 See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act: Hearing on H.R. 2037 
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gun manufacturers can act to reduce the likelihood that criminals 
and other prohibited purchasers will obtain guns. Significantly, 
these actions were taken only after cities and municipalities began 
suing the gun industry.245 
Not surprisingly, the NRA and the gun industry responded 
negatively to Smith & Wesson’s settlement. They supported a 
boycott of the gun maker, and treated Smith & Wesson as a 
pariah.246 The boycott warned all gun manufacturers that no party 
could settle without first consulting with the rest of the 
industry.247 Gun sellers contended that they only had the 
responsibility to obey the laws regulating gun sales, nothing 
more.248 They argued that ATF and other law enforcement 
                                                          
Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the 
House Comm. Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 14 (April 18, 2002) 
(statement of David J. Pasternak, on Behalf of the American Bar Association), 
available at http://energy commerce.house.gov/107/action/107-94.pdf. 
245 See Ottaway & Vobejda, supra note 243, at A11 (Smith & Wesson first 
mailed letters to its registered dealers in July 1999, giving them 60 days to 
pledge that they would comply with the “Stocking Dealer Code of Responsible 
Business Practices,” committing dealers to obey all firearms laws; to only sell 
Smith & Wesson guns with safety locks; and to closely monitor buyers to avoid 
illegal purchases); See also Complaint, Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp. (La. 
D.C. 1998)(No. 98-18575) (initiating first city suit). 
246 See, e.g., Geneva Overholser, NRA Fells Gun Maker, SEATTLE POST 
INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 15, 2001, at B4, available at 2001 WL 3555261 
(discussing the NRA’s boycott of Smith & Wesson, resulting in a 125-employee 
lay-off due to sagging sales); Vin Suprynowicz, What ‘Smart Gun’ Technology 
Is Really All About, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Feb. 3, 2002 (describing the 
boycott of Smith & Wesson as a reaction to “a sell-out deal with the Clinton 
administration equivalent to Chamberlain’s deal with Hitler over 
Czechoslovakia, that forced the bargain basement sale of the 150-year old 
Massachusetts gun-maker last year”), available at http://www.lvrj.com/lvrj_ 
home/2002/Feb-03-Sun-2002/opinion/18004463.html. 
247 Suprynowicz, supra note 246 (discussing boycott and Smith & 
Wesson’s reaction to now tow the party line). 
248 See Butterfield, supra note 203, at A17. Specifically, Lawrence G. 
Keene, Vice President and General Counsel to the NSSF said that the gun 
makers are “complying with an extensive regulatory scheme.” Id. As a result, 
the manufacturers have no responsibility to monitor what dealers do with their 
guns, he said, and “it is absurd to suggest that if criminals get their hands on 
guns the companies should be held responsible.”  
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agencies did not want them to do more to prevent sales intended 
for the criminal market.249 This “party line” mentality has 
prevented true innovation in the industry. 
Meanwhile, a gun industry trade association, the National 
Shooting Sports Foundation (“NSSF”) has implemented a 
program in response to the city suits, which underscores specific 
ways in which firearms dealers can exercise more responsibility 
in their sales.250 This program, popularly referred to as “Don’t 
Lie for the Other Guy,” recognizes that preventing straw 
purchases requires more than simply following federally-
mandated procedures.251 Rather, the materials disseminated by 
NSSF advocate “go[ing] beyond the law,” and discuss the 
benefits of a “pre-sales screening” of prospective purchasers.252 
Under the NSSF guidelines, it is not enough to simply demand 
that customers provide identification, fill out the required forms 
and undergo a criminal background check.253 An arms dealer is 
                                                          
249 Butterfield, supra note 203, at A17 (quoting the NSSF as saying that 
they had been told by the ATF that “law enforcement does not want 
manufacturers to play junior G-men and jeopardize investigations”). 
250 NSSF is a gun manufacturer trade association that represents a majority 
of foreign and domestic gun markers doing business in the United States. See 
National Shooting Sports Foundation, http://www.nssf.org (last visited Feb. 16, 
2003). 
251  National Association of Firearms Retailers, Don’t Lie for the Other Guy 
[hereinafter Don’t Lie for the Other Guy] (explaining that a federally licensed 
firearms dealer is responsible under federal law for determining the legality of 
any firearm transaction (18 U.S.C. §921-930; 27 CFR §178)), available at 
http://www.nafr.org/DontLie/index2.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2003). The 
campaign is a coordinated effort designed to educate the public on the 
consequences of purchasing a firearm for someone who legally cannot and to 
train firearms retailers on better identifying potential straw purchases. Id. Before 
transferring any firearm, a licensed dealer must first establish and verify the 
identity, place of residence and age of the buyer to insure that individuals meet 
the requirements under applicable state and federal laws. Id. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. Under the federal law, licensed gun sellers not selling guns from 
their personal collection are only required to view government issued 
identification and submit information for a background check of the purchaser 
by law enforcement. Such a check, if not completed within three days, is then 
irrelevant and the purchaser can still purchase the gun. 18 U.S.C.A. § 
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also required to verify that the individual buying the firearm is 
indeed the actual purchaser.254 
The NSSF guidelines recommend that dealers ask prospective 
purchasers a number of questions, including the “intended use” 
of the gun.255 Dealers are advised to look out for “suspicious 
acting customers who may appear nervous or evasive in their 
communications,” or even “customers who appear confident” 
who “may inadvertently reveal something if the dealer asks 
enough pertinent questions.”256 NSSF recognizes that not only 
should a dealer adequately question prospective purchasers to 
weed out illegitimate customers, but the dealer should not 
complete a sale if they have suspicions about a customer.257 
                                                          
922(t)(1)(B)(ii). See Gov’t Accounting Office Report, Gun Control: 
Opportunities to Close Loopholes in the National Instant Criminal Background 
Check System, GAP-020720 at 28 (July 2002) (recommending to Congress to 
remove the three day time limit as it does not provide the FBI with sufficient 
time in which to complete all background checks and as a result, many 
prohibited purchasers are obtaining weapons through this loophole). 
254 See Don’t Lie for the Other Guy, supra note 251, at 2. The NSSF 
guidelines suggest: 
Many retailers routinely engage their customers in a series of helpful 
questions to determine the customer’s wants and needs. By including a 
couple of questions regarding the identity of the actual purchaser in this 
pre-sales screening, retailers can provide a valuable service to law 
enforcement and to their community without offending a legitimate 
customer. 
An effective way to do this is to establish a store policy that every 
potential firearm purchaser will be asked the same sequence of 
questions. You may even want to post a sign in your store that informs 
the customer of this policy. The sign may read: to assist law 
enforcement it is out policy to go beyond the law in verifying the 
identity of the actual purchaser of a fireman. 
Id. 
255 Id. (suggesting questions such as, “Is the firearm for you or someone 
else?”; “If someone else, is this a gift?”; “What is the intended use—personal 
protection, deer hunting, target shooting?”; and “What type of firearm are you 
interested in or most comfortable with?”). 
256 Id. 
257 Id. The materials state: 
The key is to engage the customer and ask enough questions to draw 
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The materials also stress that a dealer is obligated to verify 
that the purchaser is the intended user.258 This means that, if a 
dealer is uncertain as to whether a transaction is a straw 
purchase, the dealer should not complete the sale. For instance, 
the materials list several hypothetical transactions. In one, a man 
“may simply be helping [his girlfriend] select her first handgun,” 
or he may be asking a woman to purchase a gun for him.259 In the 
view of the NSSF, the dealer should refuse the sale, even though 
he may be denying a legitimate sale.260 
Although the “Don’t Lie for the Other Guy” program could 
have been implemented much earlier and remains a voluntary 
program without great effect, it marks an important recognition 
on the part of the gun industry that their behavior can and does 
have an impact on the criminal trafficking of guns in this 
country. Because the ATF has recognized the importance of 
straw purchases on the underground gun market, any steps gun 
sellers take to impede–rather than promote–such sales, will mark 
a step in the right direction.261 City suits, public pressure and the 
threat of liability have forced the industry to reexamine the way it 
                                                          
out information on their background and intentions. If suspicions arise, 
it is more prudent to follow the precautionary principle of politely 
refusing the sale to protect yourself from the risk of contributing to a 




259 Id. (listing other examples of straw-purchases, such as when a person 
who can legally buy a firearm and wishes to do so arranges for a second person 
to pay for the gun and fill out and sign the paperwork in the second person’s 
name or when a person who is denied an approval returns to the store with a 
companion who asks to see the same firearm the man attempted to purchase and 
then the companion says that he or she would like to purchase the firearm). 
260 Id. 
261 See Weil & Knox, supra note 139, at 1761. Weil and Knox explain that 
straw purchasers’ ability to purchase large numbers of firearms with a street 
value that is much higher than their commercial price enables gun traffickers to 
make large profits and keep costs to a minimum, an important aspect of the 
underground gun market. Id. See also Braga & Kennedy, supra note 147 
(discussing undercover operations in several cities demonstrating prevalence of 
dealer compliance in straw purchases). 
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does business. When the business involves the production of 
instruments of death and destruction, it is not too much to ask for 
extra precautions in the design, distribution and marketing of 
such products. 
CONCLUSION 
The gun industry has escaped liability for their negligent 
behavior for far too long. The nation pays the price—in lives lost 
and dollars spent—for easy access to guns by criminals and 
juveniles. Lawsuits filed by cities, municipalities and states aim 
to hold the gun industry accountable for its negligent behavior. 
Critics of these lawsuits rely upon questionable statistics 
regarding the benefits of unregulated gun ownership and 
revisionist history regarding the Second Amendment to argue 
against them. Nonetheless, the ways in which the underground 
market is supplied illustrate that gun manufacturers play a vital 
role in the underground crime gun market and that manufacturers 
knowingly financially benefit from the perpetuation of this 
market. The city suits have met with mixed results in the courts. 
While some courts have dismissed these lawsuits, the ongoing 
litigation has had definite effects on the way guns are sold in this 
country. The Smith & Wesson settlement and acknowledgement 
by the gun industry trade association that it can no longer hide 
behind a veil of denial mark the dawning of a new day—where 
the gun industry will finally be taken to task for its role in 
providing criminals and juveniles easy access to guns. 
 
